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ABSTRACT
In the last several decades, philosophers of biology have published countless books and articles
on the causal mechanisms underlying evolutionary change. There has been scant effort devoted,
however, to detailed analysis of what these mechanisms mean for the relationship between our
best interpretations of evolutionary change and our metaphysical picture of the world. This thesis
addresses some key aspects of that metaphysical picture. I argue for a metaphysically realist
interpretation of dispositions as causally active in evolutionary biology. I address fitness and
evolvability in particular, as they present two of the best possible case studies for a
metaphysically realist interpretation of dispositions. I claim that dispositional realism is justified
in part based on its empirical warrant. That is, as a metaphysics of science, it gives us all the
metaphysics we need for making sense of the empirical success of science (especially biology),
and no more. I present Ontic Structural Realism as an opposing view. Ontic Structural Realism
argues for the dismissal of objects and dispositions on the basis of a certain interpretation of
fundamental physics. I present some arguments against this view and in favor of my own.
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INTRODUCTION
The philosophy of biology and metaphysics have long seemed like worlds apart. This thesis is
my attempt to bring them a bit closer together and to see how they might be profitably related to
one another. It is surprising, in a way, that there hasn’t been more work trying to bring
metaphysical clarity to bear on philosophy of biology. The philosophy of biology, after all, is
mostly the philosophy of evolutionary biology, and one of the central problems for the discipline,
historically speaking, is the “tautology problem” (see Sober, 1984). That is, philosophers have
long been troubled to explain why evolution by natural selection is not just an empty tautology
(“survival of those that survive”), but instead a rich and interesting (and contingent) empirical
thesis.
In the late 1970s a new view emerged from the philosophical literature, developed
independently in papers by John Beatty and Susan Mills (1979) and Robert Brandon (1978). This
view is known as the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness, as it takes the fitness of organisms to
be a general propensity toward leaving offspring to future generations of its species population.
This is just to say that the fitter organism is the one that’s better disposed to leaving more
offspring to future generations than its counterparts. This is part of why I say it’s a bit surprising
there hasn’t been more attention given to the metaphysical treatments of these topics in the
philosophy of biology literature. One of the central problems in philosophy of biology is clearly
tied up in talk about dispositions, and this seems to suggest that there might be good reasons to
develop a clear metaphysical analysis of what dispositions are and what kind of causal work
they’re doing in evolutionary biology (if any). This thesis is an attempt to do some of that work.
I argue for a metaphysically realist interpretation of dispositions and their causal role in
evolutionary biology. It seems to me that most of the defenders of the Propensity Interpretation
1

are already pretty close to this view. That said, one could reasonably hold to something like the
Propensity Interpretation, but defend it on basically instrumental grounds. I develop a causal
view of dispositions (like the one that the Propensity Interpretation describes) that’s more
metaphysically robust than this on the grounds that such a view does the best job of making
intelligible that which we actually observe in evolutionary biology. To do this, I take a close look
at debates over fitness and its causal role in evolutionary biology, and then extend the realist
attitude that I develop with respect to fitness and apply it to emerging conversations over the role
of evolvability in evolutionary biology. I take it that the addition of evolvability as a case study
for dispositional realism strengthens my overall position: that dispositions are real and causally
active in the evolutionary biology.
In Chapter 1, I sketch a view of dispositional realism and then relate that view to recent
discussions of fitness in evolutionary biology. My views on the metaphysics of dispositions have
been heavily influenced by Stephen Mumford, Nancy Cartwright, and Anjan Chakravartty
(among others). Cartwright and Chakravartty especially have influenced my views on the task of
metaphysics as it relates to our empirical experience of causal change in the natural sciences, and
this is a point that features throughout the thesis. I argue for a general view that takes
dispositions as causally active and not reducible (metaphysically, anyway) to counterfactual
conditionals and the like. I then argue for dispositions as causally active in evolutionary biology
more specifically, and in the case of fitness in particular. I argue further for holistic fitness (that
is, fitness understood in terms of whole organisms) as opposed to trait fitness as the right
treatment for the job. Finally, I argue that biological individuals ground the causal change
processes we see in evolution, not populations (or their structure).

2

In Chapter 2, I extend the case that I’ve made for dispositional realism in Chapter 1 and
apply it to recent work on evolvability. I argue for a conception of evolvability as a real
dispositional property of organisms, and further that it is best construed as a functional property
that’s multiply realizable. I pick up on many of the major themes raised by Rachael Brown
(2014), while shoring up what I take as some problems with her treatment.
In Chapter 3, I present an alternative view on the metaphysics of science: Ontic Structural
Realism. This view sees objects and dispositions as eliminable from our proper ontology. If this
view is correct, then it clearly presents major problems for the view I’ve outlined in chapters 1
and 2. I present counterarguments to the view. My treatment of Ontic Structural Realism mainly
focuses on two texts: James Ladyman and Don Ross (2007), and Steven French (2014). I use
French (2014) most of all, since he’s given the clearest and most convincing version of Ontic
Structural Realism to date. The counterarguments I offer partly relate to what I’ve argued in
Chapters 1 and 2, and partly they’re self-contained to Chapter 3. With Ontic Structural Realism
dispatched, we should not take its arguments as a credible threat to objects and dispositions of
the sort described in this thesis.

3

1. DISPOSITIONAL REALISM AND ORGANISMAL FITNESS
How should we talk about “fitness”? This question has received extensive treatment over the last
several decades, with the Propensity Interpretation of Fitness (PIF) emerging as the prevailing
orthodoxy (Millstein, forthcoming). At least since Darwin, fitness is usually understood in a
broadly ecological sense, which is to say that the fitness of an individual or type has no absolute
value, in the sense that its fitness is relative to things like its environment (adaptation), the
available resources (including the organism’s ability to compete for them), and its conspecifics
(including the organism’s ability to successfully mate with them).1 As regards the PIF, the basic
notion is as follows: the fitness of an organism (or type) is best conceived of as a probabilistic
propensity understood in terms of the number of offspring it can be expected to contribute to
future generations (see Sober, 2001).2 This view was first developed by Robert Brandon (1978)
and John Beatty and Susan Mills (now Finsen) (1979), and the motivation for undertaking this
project was mainly to do with the conceptual problems that plagued the “actualist” interpretation
of fitness (Beatty & Mills, 1979; Sober, 1984; Ramsey, 2006; Millstein, forthcoming).3
As far as developing a theoretically rich (and practically useful) model of fitness as
predicated on the PIF goes, much of the focus has been on developing an accurate mathematical
representation of fitness in terms of this propensity (Brandon, 1978; Brandon, 1990). At least as
often as philosophers of biology have tried to develop and defend such formalizations of the PIF,
others have leveled seemingly devastating objections against these models, even causing some

1

For a paradigmatic example of this manner of thinking, see Robert Brandon (1978).
Sober’s relationship to the PIF is somewhat problematic. At certain points, Sober (1984) seems broadly
sympathetic to the view, but in later publications he seems more skeptical. I note this just in order to emphasize that
I don’t want to ascribe a view to anyone that that person may not hold.
3
The actualist interpretation of fitness held that fitness was calculated in terms of the actual offspring left by some
type. This leads to what Sober (1984) and others call “the tautology problem,” which can be stated sloganistically as
the (undesirable) reduction of natural selection to the empty claim “the survival of those that survive.”
2

4

former proponents of the PIF to turn critics of varying degrees (see Beatty & Finsen, 1989;
Sober, 2001; Sober, 2013). One semi-canonical mathematization of the PIF involves taking
fitness as the expected number of offspring, or the arithmetic average of the probabilities for
various numbers of offspring multiplied by the number of offspring. That is, if organisms of type
O1 have a 50% chance of leaving 3 offspring and a 50% chance of leaving 7 offspring, then by
taking the arithmetic average of the relevant values we determine that organisms of type O1 are
expected to leave 5 offspring (see Sober, 2001; Ariew & Ernst 2009). Following rediscovery of
John Gillespie’s work (1973; 1974; 1979) by Beatty and Finsen, it came to be seen that the
representative models favored by propensity theorists were vulnerable to a number of
counterexamples. In the simple example given above, for instance, it turns out that we can
specify two types, O1 and O2, and make it such that they have identical fitnesses with respect to
the expected values for offspring contribution. The actual offspring contributions of the type with
lower variance in its distribution of outcomes will be greater (over time) than that of the type
with higher variance (Beatty & Finsen, 1989; Walsh, Lewens & Ariew, 2002; Ariew & Ernst,
2009). While this seems counterintuitive at first blush, a simple example helps to illustrate why
this is the case. Consider a type with a 50% chance of leaving a very high number of offspring
and a 50% chance of leaving just one. For each organism of that type, there’s a 1 in 2 chance that
it contributes very little to future generations, making the population susceptible to loss via drift
and the like. So given enough time (probably not much!) the population size is going to tend to
zero.
There are other “higher moments” of distributions that ground further objections to this
traditional construal of the PIF (mirroring the problem with variance).4 Brandon (1990) attempts

4

The skew of the distribution curve, for instance, seems to influence the contributions of genotypes to future
generations. For more, see Ariew and Ernst (2009).
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to deal with some of these objections, but at the cost of the generality that mathematical models
of this sort are meant to aim for.5 Charles Pence and Grant Ramsey (2013) offer a new
mathematical foundation for the PIF, this time using the toolkit of contemporary mathematical
and theoretical biology, the result of which is a very general and mathematically sophisticated
model that avoids the objections and counterexamples that plagued the original models.6 But
Pence and Ramsey (2013; Pence & Ramsey, 2015) are careful to point out that the success of the
PIF is not necessarily dependent on there being a successful and generalizable mathematical
model as a representation of it.7 There have been many interesting debates over what we should
understand as the best mathematical representation of evolution’s causal structure. My interest,
however, is in exploring the conceptual and metaphysical foundations of evolution and its causal
structure, especially with respect to the question of what fitness is, where the question of what
fitness is is understood as a question about basic ontological commitments and not a question
about which among the various ways of operationalizing the concept are most beneficial for
scientific practice (see Sober, 1984; Sober, 2001; Sober, 2009; Millstein, 2006; Millstein,
forthcoming).
I will argue that the causal history that the theory of evolution reveals is primarily
(although surely not only) due to the fitnesses of individuals, and that individual fitnesses are
best interpreted as dispositions. I want to make it clear at the outset, however, that “best
interpreted as” should not be taken to denote anything like an “operationalist” construal of
dispositions. Nor am I claiming that to say individual fitnesses are grounded by the dispositional
5

For more on the notion of generality (and how it may be gained or lost by different model types), see Pence and
Ramsey (2013). Clearly I’m aiming for some manner of generality here, although not necessarily of a mathematical
sort.
6
The best recapitulation of these counterexamples that I’ve seen is in Ariew and Ernst (2009). Also see Ariew and
Lewontin (2004), although Ariew and Ernst (2009) is probably a bit less technical, and so more accessible.
7
That is, it may be the case that fitness is best understood roughly as something like the PIF, but perhaps no one is
capable of modeling it mathematically (perhaps it is too complex, or something).
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features of organisms is just to say something about the concepts we deploy when talking about
the biological world. Rather, I claim that fitnesses are best interpreted as dispositions in a way
that regards dispositions as real, and that this is so because (1) dispositional realism with respect
to individuals and their attendant fitnesses best accounts for the relational nature of populations
and population change, and (2) the relational structure revealed by a commitment to dispositional
realism tells us how the direction of explanation goes. This is to say that dispositional realism
helps us to get a grip on the question of whether the primary causal agent influencing the
direction of evolution is something more like individuals or something more like populations.
Clearly, I take the former to be the case.
This chapter will go as follows: In (§1.1), I explain and defend my reasons for bracketing
questions concerning philosophical treatments of fitness as they relate to biological practice.
Philosophers of biology are often at pains to show how their work bears on contemporary
debates in the scientific literature. Further, some question the very usefulness of philosophical
work on scientific questions where the philosophical work doesn’t try to do precisely this (see
Mayr, 1982). I think this view is misguided, for reasons I will specify in (§1.1). In (§1.2), I
sketch an account of dispositional realism and its relevance to the question of what fitness is and
how fitnesses contribute to the causal structure of biological science. The account I offer draws
heavily from the work of Nancy Cartwright (1989; Cartwright & Pemberton, 2013) and Stephen
Mumford (1998). In (§1.3) I will take the account of dispositions from (§1.2) and spell out its
relation to points (1) and (2) above. In (§1.4), I offer some concluding remarks.

1.1 Bracketing the question of “Biological Practice”
As mentioned above, philosophers of biology are typically quite concerned to ensure that their
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work makes close contact with real world biological practices. To say what this means requires a
bit of unpacking. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009) describes two basic ways in which biologists are
typically inclined to approach scientific problems. They might offer a “standard summary” of
phenomena, whereby scientists try to offer “literally true” descriptions of the “important features
of all cases of a phenomenon” (or, more likely, a true description of some class that can be taken
to extend, roughly, to each member of that class) (Godfrey-Smith, 2009). Another approach uses
simple cases (and possibly even counterfactual cases) as models that serve to explain some
central feature of the phenomenon in question.

1.1.1 The model-based approach
Much of contemporary philosophy of biology focuses on this latter approach that takes models as
central. Talk of models is commonplace in philosophy of science. The use of models has proven
especially helpful with respect to physical theories (see Contessa, 2006; Frigg, 2006; Giere,
1999).8 But the use of models can be helpful in biology, too. There is some precedent for the use
of “model organisms,” for instance, where these can either be simple organisms that are taken as
models for evolutionary change more broadly, or hypothetical organisms, as in the case of
computer simulations of evolutionary change (Godfrey-Smith, 2006).9
The benefit of this model-based approach is that it makes scientific questions more
tractable, and so scientific research more executable (Giere, 1999). If we take the fitness of a
trait, for instance, as the average fitness of organisms having that trait, then we have a clear-cut
model for fitness that cuts through much of the extraneous biological noise that might otherwise
confuse our findings. The total fitness of individual organisms given their trait complexes, say,
8

It is, perhaps, not surprising that physics finds such affinity with model-based analysis, since physics is so wellrepresented via mathematical tools.
9
Dawkins’ algorithm from The Blind Watchmaker (1996) is a famous, if simplistic example.
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might feature in biological reality somehow, but to measure each of these values one-by-one
would be tremendously difficult, and so a model of fitness taken in terms of fitness averages is
more practically useful. Indeed, according to Sober (2013), “Biologists get along quite well by
thinking about the fitnesses of traits that are shared among organisms; the fitness of the total trait
complex that a token organism uniquely possesses is typically beyond their ken.

1.1.2 The standard summary approach
It’s worth noting that models of this sort do not seem to constitute the only conceptions of fitness
that are of typically interest to biologists. Philosophers of biology have demonstrated that in
certain cases, biologists do appear to be interested in the fitness of organisms in a more holistic
sense (the sense seemingly rejected as biologically useless by Sober (2013)). This is perhaps
most in keeping with the first approach mentioned by Godfrey-Smith (see Millstein, 2009;
Brandon & Ramsey, 2007; Pence & Ramsey, 2015). This approach squares especially well with
scientific research executed through field observations and the like. For instance, a plant scientist
conducting fieldwork on how a particular species of orchid is responding to climate change is
going to be more interested in offering a full description of the plant and its response to external
conditions than in how her findings model climate change more broadly. Notably, I’m engaged in
neither sort of project mentioned by Godfrey-Smith.

1.1.3 Philosophy of science and metaphysics of science
Isn’t there space for an exploration of the central ontological commitments of evolutionary
biology that doesn’t take biological practice as an article of central concern? The typical reasons
for privileging scientific practice can usually be classified in one of two ways. The first simply

9

concerns the kinds of research questions that philosophers of science are interested in exploring.
Philosophers of science often aren’t interested in questions that aren’t practically useful to
scientific practice, and this, perhaps, generates a certain cognitive bias against philosophy of
science that’s done without such a strict eye toward the practical benefits of one’s philosophical
research.10 But this doesn’t do anything at all to show that philosophy of science done with an
eye toward ontology and metaphysics should not be done. The second sort of objection one
typically finds is broadly historical.
It’s risky business, historically, when philosophers of science say that they wish to
explore the metaphysical commitments of a theory, and it seems especially so for philosophers of
biology. In the history of the natural sciences, it is not uncommon to see opposing views derided
as unduly “metaphysical.” 18th century Newtonians derided the corpuscularianism of the
Cartesians as metaphysical for lack of its predictive capability and its seemingly inflated
ontology (to include, it seems, an inflation of causal powers). The Cartesians derided the
Newtonians as metaphysical due to their seeming refusal to specify a mechanism responsible for
gravitational force; thus did they consider the “forces” postulated by the Newtonians as “occult”
in character (see Shapin, 1996).
There are similar worries in the historical background of biological science. Worries
about “essentialism” in biology, for instance, have occupied many of biology’s most prominent
figures.11 The “orthodox view,” as John Wilkins (2009) holds it, is that thanks to the influence of
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy in the west, most of western thought, scientific or otherwise,
has been haunted by the specter of essentialism. But, thanks to Darwin, biology is now framed in
terms of “population thinking,” which gives conceptual priority to difference and eschews the
10

For a reasonably good representative of this view, see James McLaurin and Heather Dyke (2012).
“Vitalism” presents another prominent example of a concept derided as unduly “metaphysical” by the lights of
modern biology. Mayr (1982) discusses this in some detail.
11
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notion that any biological thing is what it is essentially or necessarily (Mayr, 1982). Rather, the
things of biology are what they are contingently, and so essences, vital forces, and all other
basically “metaphysical” concepts, objects, and qualities have to be left to the side.12 So it is that
this troubled historical relationship between biology and Platonic/Aristotelian metaphysics
makes it difficult for philosophers interested in exploring the relationship between biological
science and subjects of concern to contemporary metaphysics to justify themselves in doing so.
But of course these traditional concerns from the history of science (and biology in
particular) trade on a fairly outmoded conception of what metaphysicians are typically trying to
show. Recent work in the philosophy of science (esp. physics) has gone quite some way toward
demonstrating the scientific respectability of certain forms of metaphysical inquiry. This work
has focused on the nature and existence of certain structural features of scientific theories (in the
ontological sense) (Ladyman & Ross, 2007), the extent to which results from “traditional”
analytic metaphysics (which is to say, metaphysical work that’s not understood to have been
addressing scientific questions directly) can be taken as broadly homologous to the concepts
employed by “scientific metaphysics” (French, 2014), and to what extent scientific realism can
(or must) be grounded by some manner of metaphysical theory (Chakravartty, 2007;
Chakravartty, 2013).13 Clearly I disagree with much of the work in this field, as I will no doubt
show in Chapter 3 of this thesis. But, in any case, there are clear examples of metaphysical
projects regarded as basically methodologically responsible by scientific lights in the domain of
physics. No reason has yet been given that would show why philosophy of biology cannot also

12

I refer the reader back to Wilkins’ (2009) treatment of the history of the species problem. He does a tremendous
job of showing why these traditional concerns (to do with essentialism and the like) are really quite misplaced.
13
Ladyman, Ross, and Kincaid have a (2015) volume entitled Scientific Metaphysics that touches on many of these
themes. I refer the reader there. It should be noted that I’m not interested in “scientific metaphysics” as they seem to
understand it. That is, I don’t take science as a fundamental constraint on metaphysics. I’m interested instead in how
the two may be fruitfully related to one another, however they’re conceived.
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target questions of metaphysical concern, so long as the objects of such concern are carefully
stated and the subject of investigation is amenable to metaphysical modes of inquiry.14
I take it that the question of what fitness is clearly qualifies under these conditions. There
is great merit in investigating which operationalized models of X are most useful for scientific
practice, but questions of a more explicitly ontological flavor are also important for philosophy
of science, even if they’re not of interest to practicing scientists as such. Of course, the
intersection of metaphysics and science should respect the empirical constraints that the sciences
enforce given the evidence on offer. Metaphysical analyses in philosophy of physics and general
philosophy of science have helped to clarify the central ontological commitments of scientific
theories and the conceptual schemes that typify them, all while respecting the empirical
deliverances of the theories they treat. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, so
there’s no reason to think that philosophy of biology cannot engage in methodologically
responsible metaphysics. This is different, however, than the claim that metaphysical
commitments can just be “read-off” of the relevant science. Science constrains the content of
metaphysics, but it does not determine it.

1.2 Sketching dispositional realism (and why it matters for biology)
Take any canonical dispositional feature of certain objects—fragility, say—and surely you will
find defenders of any one of half a dozen (or more) interpretations of disposition ascriptions like
“x is fragile.” It is possible, at least, to take the ascription of fragility (or ascriptions rather like
the ascription of fragility) as denoting some real feature of the object in question. Some form of

14

It is possible to argue that physics is unique with respect to the applicability of metaphysics because physics is
foundational to all other sciences. More of this will be covered in Chapter 3. For now, see Ladyman and Ross (2007,
p. 27).
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this interpretation is what I aim to defend here. First, however, it is necessary to explain why
some of the popular alternative interpretations are inadequate.15

1.2.1 Some preliminaries and a note on motivations
As something of a preliminary note, I would like to point out that dispositions, propensities,
capacities, and powers are often treated pretty much interchangeably. Nancy Cartwright (1989;
Cartwright & Pemberton, 2013) prefers to speak in terms of capacities. Anjan Chakravartty
(2013) and Stephen Mumford (1998) speak in terms of dispositions. E.J. Lowe (2008) prefers to
speak in terms of powers. Noting this terminological issue, let it be known that I will be speaking
in terms of dispositions (although I may slip into one of the alternative vernaculars from time to
time), but I understand everything I claim here to apply equally well to talk in terms of powers,
propensities and capacities.
The main concern that motivates my realist view of dispositional features is this: the
canonical effects issuing from observations of interactions between objects must answer to
something about the objects under observation.16 Stated another way, it seems to me implausible
that the regularity of certain events (i.e. the “constant conjunction” of specific event types, in
Humean terms) can be anything like a brute fact having nothing to do with the properties of the
things that stand as participants in the events (see Lowe, 2008). To see why, it helps to use an
example. Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) use the simple example of “wind pushing a blowable
thing.” Here we witness a change process that takes the starting arrangement of some suitably

15

One reason, which I don’t mention in detail, is that most of the alternatives lead to some theory of event causation,
and E.J. Lowe (2008) has shown that event causal frameworks are flimsier than has been appreciated generally.
16
Lowe (2008) claims that a robust theory of causation requires a robust account of the causal powers attributable to
various substance types. I find that I agree, in general, but I would add that a realist metaphysics of causation
requires the further qualification that we need not successfully make such attributions in order to defend the claim
that the powers in question do in fact exist.
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blowable object (imagine a toy sailboat) and sufficiently gusty conditions, where the sufficiently
gusty conditions exercise their power on the blowable object, and the blowable object exercises
its power to catch the wind, and so move to another physical arrangement causally downstream
from the initial one.
We can imagine more complex examples. While I’m no horologist, I understand that my
automatically winding watch is a rather complex mechanical system. Some of the components
involved in the successful operation of the watch movement include small jewels that act like
ball bearings for the various sliding components; a windable spring mechanism that allows the
movement to acquire the necessary energy for starting the movement on its task to tell time
reasonably accurately; a separate subroutine of moving parts that accounts for the watch’s ability
to keep track of the day and date; and a weighted pendulum capable of transferring energy to the
spring mechanism so that my body’s kinetic movements can wind the watch (saving me the
effort of winding it manually each morning). An automatic watch movement is clearly much
more intricate than I can adequately communicate here, but this rudimentary description suffices
for our purposes here. The success of the watch movement in performing its function answers to
the fact that each of the components in the physical arrangement offers the right sort of causal
contribution. That is, there are canonical effects issuing from objects, of the relevant types, in the
arrangement of parts, and these effects are due to the dispositional properties that we track in and
throughout our observations of the world (Cartwright, 1989; Cartwright & Pemberton, 2013).17

17

One might hold that it’s the categorical rather than the dispositional features of the watch movement that account
for its ability to make manifest certain canonical effects. There are, however, good reasons to doubt this. One reason
is that dualism with respect to properties (that is, holding that there are both dispositional and categorical properties
of things) itself seems questionable. For a more thorough discussion of this, see Mumford (1998 pp. 64-91). See also
C.B. Martin (1994, pp. 1-8). I take no stance on whether property monism or property dualism is correct. I’m open
to the possibility that categorical properties are indispensable to both metaphysics and science. But I am committed
to the view that dispositions are importantly causal. For a clear explanation of the central causal role played by
dispositional properties in science, see Chakravartty (1998). See also Chakravartty (2007).
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So to say that some object (or kind), X, has some disposition, D, is to make a causal
claim (Mumford, 1998). That is, to say that X is disposed to behave D-ishly is to make a claim
about X and its ability to make it such that D-ish things can happen in the world.18 This is
something of a controversial claim, but one that I think is defensible. Alternatively, some have
taken a non-causal view of dispositions that treats them as analyzable in terms of conditionals
(counterfactual or otherwise). Of course, such treatments need not be non-causal (see Malzkorn,
2000), but for now I focus my attention on non-causal conditional and counterfactual analyses.

1.2.2 Early versions of conditional analysis
Early attempts to conditionalize dispositions deployed the logic of material implication in order
to do so.19 Here, the possession of a disposition D by an object x is just the truth of a conditional
of the form “if Fx, then Gx.”20 This approach ran into a number of problems almost
immediately.21 As an example of such problems, for “if Fx then Gx,” let F stand for “has been
submerged in water,” let G stand for “will dissolve,” let x name some quantity of sugar, and let
Dx stand for the truth of the disposition ascription “sugar is soluble,” which is true just in case “if
Fx then Gx” turns out true. Since the falsity of the antecedent entails the truth of the conditional,
we have that Dx successfully obtains for any sugar that is never tested (placed in water). The
dispositional realist is glad with this half of the claim. The realist, after all, is keen to show that a
disposition like solubility is held by its suitable objects even if never manifested. However, in
similar fashion to the above, ~Dx successfully obtains for conditionals of the form “if Fx then
~Gx,” where the sugar is not appropriately tested and ~Dx obtains just in case the conditional is
18

I take it that this is broadly consistent with Anjan Chakravartty’s version of dispositional realism in his
“Semirealism” paper (1998). See also Cartwright (2015).
19
See Ryle (1949) for a paradigm example.
20
See Mumford (1998, pp. 45-50).
21
Mumford (1998, pp. 50-62) gives a nice historical sketch of these problems.
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true. So, according to Carnap (1936), we have it that for objects never tested, both Dx and ~Dx.
This is problematic (clearly).

1.2.3 Contemporary treatments: counterfactual and modal
Perhaps some other manner of reducing dispositions to conditionals avoids those objections
raised against indicative conditionals. If dispositions are basically causal, as Mumford claims
(and as I’m claiming), then perhaps it is possible to embed dispositions in counterfactual
conditionals and take this as the proper analysis of disposition ascriptions. This approach would
not fall prey to the objections leveled against conditionals cast in the mode of material
implication, since counterfactuals state what would be the case rather than what is the case,
placing problems related to untested dispositions safely to the side.22
So, instead of analyzing solubility as a conditional of the form, “If the sugar cube is
placed in water, then it will dissolve,” the counterfactual construal of dispositions will give us the
form, “Were the sugar cube placed in water, then it would dissolve.” Clearly, counterfactuals
can’t fall prey to the objections leveled against indicative conditionals, since here the analysis
already entails that the antecedent is false (that is, we take for granted that the sugar cube has not
been submerged in water) (Prior, Pargetter & Jackson, 1982). Untested dispositions are no
problem for a counterfactual—none of the objects embedded in such subjunctives are supposed
to have been tested.
An immediate objection arises. We would not typically want to say that an object no
longer possesses its disposition D in the very process of D-ing (Mumford, 1999; Mellor, 1974).
Returning to the example of solubility, if we analyze the solubility of sugar in water as the

22

See Loux (2006, pp. 195-203) for a nice overview discussion on conditional accounts of causation and the
motivations underlying such accounts.
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counterfactual claim, “Were the specified quantity of sugar placed in water, then it would
dissolve,” then we’re seemingly forced into a position of endorsing the rather odd claim that the
sugar does not have the dispositional feature of solubility in such instances as it is currently
manifesting solubility (Mumford, 1998, p. 6).
Consider instead the disposition x is fragile. If we say that fragile things break when
(suitably) dropped, and then analyze this in terms of the counterfactual claim, “Were x dropped,
then x would break,” the implication is that an object that is now breaking is not fragile (Mellor,
1974, p. 169). It can be legitimately demanded, however, that the counterfactualist explain just
when in the process of breaking it is that the disposition is discharged. Is it just when at least 51
percent of the objects matter has broken? Perhaps so, but then it seems that fragility is retained in
at least some substantial portion of the total duration of the breakage event.
Perhaps the above objection can be circumvented by recourse to some manner of modal
analysis of counterfactuals and causation. If we can grant some version of counterpart theory as
the right mode of analysis (whether concrete or abstract), then we can say that for any object x
and any disposition D, Dx can be analyzed as the counterfactual claim that “Were x to F, then x
would D,” and argue further that present manifestations are no problem because for any x there
will, in some nearby possible world, be some counterpart x* for which it is not the case that D is
being presently manifested. An in-depth investigation into the philosophical controversies over
counterpart theory is beyond the scope of this project. For our purposes, however, I take it that
Jonathan Jacobs (2010) and Alexander Pruss (2002) have argued fairly convincingly that
counterpart theory (concrete or otherwise) introduces unnecessary elements into our ontology
(see also Merricks, 2003).23 As Jacobs points out, the piece of counterpart theory that seems
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Merricks’ paper is mainly a destructive assault on counterpart theory. Jacobs (2010) offers a nice constructive
continuation of Merricks.
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relevant for analyzing properties and dispositions is the fact that some object x is in some
important sense similar in its properties and capacities to a counterpart x*.24 But this kind of an
analysis doesn’t seem to require counterparts at all. We usually have no issue grounding
similarity relations in our normal observations of the world, and indeed, much of natural science
depends on our ability to do precisely that. This, according to Jacobs and Pruss, seemingly
obviates any need for recourse to counterparts and the worlds they inhabit.25

1.2.4 Modalized conditionals as a mode of conceptual analysis
It may be the case that (non counterpart-theoretic) modal treatments of conditionalized
dispositions can work as a mode of conceptual analysis. The value of such projects is broadly
heuristic. Malzkorn (2000), for instance, argues that there need be no tension between
conditional treatments of dispositions and realist attitudes toward dispositions. One can be fully
consistent in holding that dispositions are real, causal, and that they aren’t fully captured by any
formal semantic treatment (whether because of interfering conditions in the world, “finkishness,”
or whatever), and still hold that conditional analysis is useful for clarifying concepts and building
conceptual frameworks. I find myself in agreement with this attitude.
Jacobs (2010, pp. 243-6), for instance, develops a fairly robust modal semantics for
dispositions and powers cast as counterfactual conditionals. Clearly Jacobs is a realist about
dispositions and their causal roles; that’s the entire point of his argument! But still, having a nice
24

Carwright (2015) makes a similar claim, where she argues we should favor a “this worldly” metaphysics where
such this worldliness suffices for our explanatory purposes. Her analysis, though, extends even to “Laws of Nature,”
not just worlds populated by counterparts.
25
Jacobs says, for instance, that my having the property of possibly being a truck driver is grounded in my
physiological properties (being tall enough, having enough upper-body strength, sufficiently good eyesight,
etc.) and also the fact that individuals relevantly like me in this world are able to drive trucks. For Pruss’s part,
he argues that to possibly have a certain property or to have the property of possibly bringing about (or initiating)
some causal process is grounded in the actual world being such that such properties and causal processes are
instanced in that world (and, presumably, being the sort of thing such that you can bring about or make manifest
such an instancing).
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semantic scheme is helpful for clarifying the concepts and sentences we use for talking about this
sort of thing. This need not be a problem for dispositional realism.
But we shouldn’t let ourselves slide into thinking that conditional analyses of dispositions
(modal or otherwise) are anything other than conceptual analyses. A conceptual reduction of
dispositions to counterfactual conditionals is not a metaphysical reduction of dispositions to
counterfactual conditionals. And indeed, I don’t think there’s much hope for a metaphysical
reduction of powers to any sort of conditional treatment, no matter how robust the semantics—
and the examples that I draw from the natural sciences should help in demonstrating why that is.
In short, nature doesn’t operate according to semantic rules.

1.2.5 Quinean Mechanisms
It may be possible, in Quinean fashion, to take disposition talk as just short for mechanistic
descriptions that haven’t yet been made. For Quine, a mechanistic description is one that
explicates natural operations in terms of microphysical parts and their causal interactions. The
slogan version of Quine’s position is that there’s no change “without microphysical change”
(Quine, 1981, p. 98). So perhaps disposition talk mainly issues from certain epistemic limitations
since some such mechanisms may be difficult to explicate; but we need not lose heart since these
limitations will eventually be overcome as science progresses (Quine, 1960). Mumford (1998)
recognizes that we are not generally aware of the relevant mechanisms responsible for the
dispositional behaviors of each class of objects under investigation, but Quine doesn’t take this
as a problem. The repeated success of scientific explanation offers a sufficiently good
“promissory note” to the effect that we ought to be confident that a precise scientific (read:
mechanistic) explanation is in principle possible, and that the relevant mechanisms are present
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throughout all disposition manifestations.26 If that’s right, then perhaps we ought not be realists
about dispositions so much as realists about mechanisms.

1.2.6 Dispositions in physical science
But is it true that scientific explanations are only mechanistic explanations in the Quinean sense?
Do explanations in terms of dispositions not figure in scientific explanation? It seems that
dispositions do, in fact, figure in scientific explanation, and fairly prominently at that. Ian
Thompson (1988) argues that scientific explanation is often concerned not just with predictions
and explanations concerning what will happen, but also what may happen, even if the conditional
probability of the realization of certain physically possible scenarios is quite small.27 This is
especially true in various engineering contexts (see Mellor, 1974). There’s good reason, also, to
think that quantum systems display irreducibly dispositional properties. Thompson (1988)
explains that position and velocity are “not continuously definite, but only have specific values
in suitable situations such as measurement interactions of certain kinds.” This suggests a
dispositional interpretation of quantum mechanics, and further, if we understand the relational
(and statistical) features of quantum mechanics ontologically, then we’re committed to a fairly
robust realism concerning dispositions (Thompson, 1988; Popper, 1959; Suarez, 2007). If we
take seriously the notion of modal and statistical facts as parts of the world’s ontology (and so
not artifacts of epistemic limitations), then dispositions are part of the world, and feature as chief
components of our causal explanations (Cartwright, 1989; Mumford, 1998; Molnar, 2003).
Indeed, the capacities of objects to make manifest certain effects in the world seems to square
26

An argument like the pessimistic meta-induction may apply here, too. That is, it may be that arguments for
scientific “promissory notes” may be dismissed on the grounds that future explanatory schemes may overturn our
present ones, and we have no real idea of what such explanatory schemes might look like.
27
Even prohibitively small conditional probabilities are non-zero probabilities, and so should count in the
dispositional profile of the phenomenon in question.
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better as an explanation of the world’s operations than any thoroughly mechanistic (or rigidly
deterministic) explanation—and this is so even with respect to scientific practice.28 In many
cases (as with quantum systems) there is precious little in the way of empirical support for the
notion that the fundamental operations of nature are law-like, strictly mechanical, or rigidly
deterministic.29 Instead, the world usually displays some calculable measure of regularity, and so
we say that when certain conditions obtain, then certain specified effects are probabilified to
degree x.30 Dispositions offer only as much metaphysics as is needed to make sense of natural
science, and no more (see Cartwright, 2015).

1.2.7 Dispositions in the life sciences
But what about biology? Can the life sciences countenance the same manner of support for
dispositions as the physical sciences? It is my position that they can (and must). Richard Boyd
(1999) suggests that systematic biology depends, at least in part, on organizing groups based not
just on properties as such, but on causal properties. That is, at least part of a particular
conceptual organization of the biological world is due to the fact that a class of objects under
inspection stands as witness to the same set of causal relations.31 Boyd’s analysis does not make
a clear invocation of dispositions, but his argument is still relevant here. Boyd is clearly
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Cartwright (1989) provides some nice examples of the practical usefulness of capacities and dispositions with
respect to econometrics and theoretical treatments of superconductivity. While I don’t wish to use the practical
success of such analyses are a key justification for my own arguments, I do think the fact that such analyses do
feature prominently in real-world scientific contexts should help to allay any fears that might cause someone to think
that what I’m doing should be held in suspicion.
29
Cartwright (2015) argues that while we have some support for the notion that certain engineering contexts, and
perhaps some subset of natural scientific contexts appear deterministic, it’s hardly reasonable to extrapolate from
these limited cases and conclude that all natural scientific contexts are deterministic. Stuart Kauffman (2013)
provides good reasons to think that global determinism is untenable precisely because of what we know about how
biological processes work. See also Philip Clayton (2013)
30
Mumford (1998) argues that an interpretation of disposition manifestations as merely probabilified to
some degree is perhaps the best candidate interpretation given that (as realists, anyway) we want to be able
to say that things can be D-ishly disposed even if D is never manifested by X.
31
This is not meant in the same sense as something like a causal theory of semantics (see Sider, 2012).

21

committed to the notion that causal properties (at least in part) account for our ability to
taxonomize biological entities. My argument goes only one step further in claiming that
dispositions are the causal properties we’re after. None of this requires a slide into some
objectionable form of essentialism, though. In systematics, for instance, biological properties
can, in effect, be organized into equivalence classes insofar as the properties of biological types
are sufficiently similar. The best test for sufficiency is to be understood in terms of similar
manifestations of effects (which answer to dispositions).
Outside of systematics, dispositional analysis seems to feature fairly prominently in
functional morphology. The evolution of dark skin in humans, for instance, is plausibly linked to
folic acid loss in populations exposed to more hours of direct sunlight (Jablonski, 2002). Higher
UV exposure inhibits the body’s ability to properly metabolize folic acid, resulting in increased
instances of neural tube deficiency in infants. Darker skin, however, acts as a prophylactic to the
effects of UV exposure, lending support to the notion that there was a selective regime favoring
darker skin in humans. But biological systems are notoriously noisy, perhaps—much like other
natural phenomena—supporting an ontological interpretation of statistically driven dispositions.
In that case it should not be understood that increased melanization can be reasonably thought of
as a determinate outcome, but instead as a disposition, the manifestation of which generates a
selective signal in evolutionary history. Dispositions in evolutionary biology will receive fuller
treatment in the next section, but for now I think these examples are sufficient to show that
there’s little reason to think that dispositions do not feature regularly in the life sciences, just as
they appear to do in the physical sciences.
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1.2.8 Summing up
Dispositional realism, then, appears well supported and well motivated. Against analyses of
disposition ascriptions in terms of conditionals and against explaining away dispositions with
successful scientific descriptions (that is, mechanistic descriptions), dispositions can be
reasonably argued for as real features of the world’s ontology. Both the physical and biological
sciences seem to appeal to explanations taken in terms of dispositions, and so there’s little reason
to think them undesirable by scientific lights.

1.3 Dispositions and the causal ground of evolution
I argued in the conclusion of (§1.2) that dispositional realism need not be thought of as
undesirable by scientific lights, and that explanation via dispositions is actually quite important
to the natural sciences (to include the life sciences). I now wish to focus on evolutionary biology
more explicitly, and show how dispositional realism helps to explain change in biological
populations over time. I take the somewhat controversial view that it is the fitnesses of whole
organisms (not their traits) and so individuals (not populations) that figure in the causal ground
of population dynamics.32

1.3.1 Holistic vs. trait fitness
We saw earlier that Sober (2013) takes the fitnesses of individuals—understood as the fitness
values of total trait complexes—as causally impotent. It seems that he means one of two things
by this (or perhaps he means both, strictly speaking, but understands that each of the objections

32

I’m not sure how controversial this claim is insofar as the claim is understood in the ontological sense that I
defend here. The overwhelming majority of the literature focuses on the practical use of population concepts vs.
concepts privileging individuals, so certain in that context my claims are controversial—but I’m not operating in that
context.
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applies only in certain contexts). On the one hand, he seems to have concerns about how to
operationalize a holistic conception of fitness. As he puts it, biologists may be interested in the
fitness of dorsal fins, but they’re surely not interested in the fitness of “Charlie the Tuna.”33 He
seems to mean that measuring or estimating the fitness value of Charlie’s total trait complex is
too difficult and time consuming to cut any real ice against scientific problems. Focusing on
dorsal fins and operationalizing dorsal fin fitness in terms of the average fitness of all the
creatures sharing that trait offers the opportunity of a tractable research endeavor, and so this
conception of fitness ought to be favored over the other, more holistic conception.
But Sober (1984) also makes it sound as though the claim that holistic fitness is “causally
impotent” is to be taken more or less at face value. In explaining the tendency of a population
toward an equilibrium frequency, for instance, he claims that it is trait fitnesses that explain the
frequency of alleles in a population, and not anything else.34 My own view can tolerate the claim
of causal impotence if understood in the former, more practical sense (I’ve already noted that I
mean to bracket questions about biological practice, per se). But the claim that the total fitnesses
of individuals really don’t figure in the causal foundations of evolutionary change seems too
quick.

1.3.2 Holistic fitness as causal
Recall Ernst Mayr’s (1982) claim that part of Darwin’s genius is that he introduced—or at least
settled the conditions of the possibility for—“population thinking.” The importance of
population thinking is supposed to be that it privileges the notion of differences between
33

Pence and Ramsey (2015) point out that John Endler’s (1986) survey of methods in evolutionary biology casts
serious doubt on the claim that biologists don’t care about the fitness of “Charlie the Tuna.”
34
This claim might be understood in a less literal sense, where traits are taken to model fitnesses of genotypes in a
population, for instance. Nothing that Sober (1984) says seems to prohibit a more explicitly literal understanding,
and so I employ such an understanding here.
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organisms not just in interspecific contexts, but also with respect to intraspecific contexts. That is
to say, one of the key drivers of change within a population is due to the manifest differences
between members of the same species population.35
But what sort of differences? It helps to revisit R.C. Lewontin’s (1970) classic “Units of
Selection” paper and the three principles of selection that he lists:
(1) Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, physiologies
and behaviors.
(2) Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction in different
environments.
(3) There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution of each to
future generations.
Without denying any of the importance of (3), I focus here on (1) and (2). There is a clear sense
in which individual fitnesses, taken in the holistic sense, are important for any robust account of
why conditions (1) and (2) can be said to hold generally. Take, for instance, the claim in (2) that
different phenotypes experience different success rates depending on the environment. A similar
claim can be made with respect to the fitness values of individual traits. That is, if organisms are
to be properly understood as trait complexes, then it cannot be the case that the measurement of
some trait T1 can be a sufficiently good proxy in general for what fitness is and what fitness
values can explain more broadly, and this is because the actual benefits that T1 can confer upon
an organism must account for T1’s broad-based interactions with other traits in the organisms’s
trait complex.
The facts about an individual’s morphology and physiology have deep consequences for
how the fitnesses of individual traits can figure in the reproductive success of said individual.
35

This shouldn’t be too controversial, since competition between conspecifics, for instance, is quite commonplace.
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Consider the effects of pleiotropy.36 If we account for the fitness of some trait T1 in terms of the
average fitness of individuals having that trait, then we might think that we can generate certain
predictions concerning a possible optimization process on T1, for instance. But it may be the case
that some step in the optimization of T1 requires structural changes in a cis-regulatory region
controlling the expression of genes coding the proteins associated with the structures involved in
T1 (see Stern, 2010). But in instances where regulatory changes such as this occur near the
beginning of a developmental sequence, the effects will likely be pleiotropic, and likely
detrimental overall because changes at early steps in a developmental sequence usually
morphologically catastrophic. Similarly, certain traits in the trait complex of an organism may
have epistatic37 effects on other traits, resulting in fitness values of that may be less than the sum
of the values added together as discrete values (Stern, 2010).
In the same way that Darwinian fitness can only be interpreted against an ecological
backdrop, the fitness of individual traits can only really be understood once we’ve considered the
trait’s interactions with the rest of the trait complex in which it’s embedded. Biological traits,
after all, are situated in relational contexts. Organic bodies are relational complexes such that the
traits they exemplify can see their typical effects influenced by other biological traits in
important ways.38 Since it is the individuals, as trait complexes, that either will or will not
contribute progeny to future generations (and since the likelihood of doing so is a function of the
conditional probability of survivorship to viability, among other things), it certainly seems as
though individuals are (at least part of) the causal basis of population change.

36

Pleiotropy occurs when changes to one genetic element result in more than one change to an organism’s
phenotype.
37
Epistasis occurs when one gene suppresses the typical effects of another gene. One gene is often said to “modify
the gene whose effects it suppresses.
38
See Stern (2010pp. 79-101). See also Alex Rosenberg (2006).
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1.3.3 A semi-formal gloss on fitness as a disposition
Individual fitnesses, then, express something like a disposition, where we say that an organism
O1 is fitter than organism O2 if O1 is better disposed to leaving offspring for future generations.39
Call this disposition F. F is dependent upon the causal contributions of dispositions associated
with individual traits without being reducible to any of the fitness values of any of the traits
taken individually. Call each of these dispositions associated with individual traits fn , where n is
some natural number that picks out an individual trait in the total trait complex of some organism
O. So, F = the causal potency conferred by the interactions of (f1, … , fn) in the trait complex of
O. The causal potency of F should not be understood as the raw computation of the average
fitnesses for each of the traits, added together one-by-one. As mentioned already, pleiotropy and
epistasis make it such that the fitness of a trait complex cannot be so computed. Instead, for
“sum,” read something like the statement “total account of the causal interactions between each
of the little f-es.”
But if F is accounted for in terms of the total causal interactions between (f1, … , fn), then
why is it not the case that the individual traits, and their fitnesses, fn,, account for the causal basis
of population change? The answer is that there are no traits in biology, only trait complexes.
Contra Sober (1984; 2001; 2013), it looks to me as though careful analysis (as in the above) puts
traits in the backseat, causally speaking. Since traits are always embedded in trait complexes, and
the interactions of traits in complexes will determine (or at least influence) the causal
contribution of any particular trait, it seems there is no way to interpret the causal contribution of
any particular biological trait outside of its participation in a trait complex. Traits may have some
causal power, but they don’t do much on their own. The f1 of T1 is dependent on the causal power
39

This reflects something like the pairwise comparisons of Bouchard and Rosenberg (2004). It’s certainly true that
fitness is comparative, whether or not the comparative nature of fitness is best understood in terms of pairwise
comparisons of organisms (see Millstein, 2006; Millstein, forthcoming).
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of the big disposition F, but F is not symmetrically dependent the causal influence of any
particular fi.

1.3.4 Connecting back to dispositional realism
Clearly F is relational, just as Darwinian ecological fitnesses are relational. But what does this
have to do with realism about dispositions? The main reason dispositional realism ought to be
brought to bear on questions of fitness (and evolution more broadly) can be illustrated in terms of
the nature of F. Recall that F cannot be cast in terms of the arithmetic sum of (f1, … , fn), since
epistatic effects, for instance, can make it such that the fitness of two traits taken together is less
than the arithmetic sum of their fitness values understood discretely (Stern, 2010). It seems to me
a live option that the specific causal interactions that would compute a precise specification of F
are inaccessible to us, given that biological systems are famously noisy, and given that the
relevant causal interactions are web-like and bushy. We may write promissory notes to ourselves
to the effect that we will one day understand the full causal profile of some trait complex, but I
remain skeptical. At any rate, it seems to me that the issuance of effects from the causal
contribution of objects is best accounted for by a realist understanding of dispositions, where
disposition ascriptions are true of their objects at all times (Mumford, 1998). It is not the case,
for instance, that DNA was only disposed to leave a certain refraction pattern after x-rays had
been refracted off of DNA molecules. Rather, DNA was always so disposed toward refracting xrays in a certain pattern, but it wasn’t until the 1960s that anyone did so. Likewise, DNA would
have been so disposed even if x-ray technology had never been discovered, and so even if no
ascription of such a disposition could ever have been made.
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Likewise with F. That is, even if it were the case that a full description of the causal
interactions encoded by (f1, … , fn) is not possible even in principle, the causal contributions and
the dispositions they issue from are still very real and very present. I take it that dispositions, if
actual, should not be so only insofar as some ascription of the disposition has been successfully
made. Rather, dispositions, if actual, are actual always, and so the possession of them is not
subject to our cognitive limitations.40

1.3.5 What about populations?
But even if one grants me that it is fitness in this holistic sense and not trait fitness that accounts
for the causal basis of population change, one might still wonder whether it is not features of
populations themselves that properly account for the causal basis of population change, and not
individuals. Millstein (2006) argues that populations are the right unit of analysis for tracking
causal change in evolution. Godfrey-Smith (2009) seems to concur. Millstein (2006) argues that
evolution is indeed a causal theory, and that selection (and fitness)41 count as causal components
of the theory of evolution. But, she claims, these are best taken as population-level features; and
so it is populations that constitute the real meat of a causal theory of evolution.
She argues that frequency-dependent selection and density-dependent selection are good
examples of population-level features that influence the direction of population change.42
Mimicry, for instance, is only a successful strategy for avoiding predation if it is not too
widespread in a population. So, if a few butterflies mimic the coloring patterns of another
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Also, clearly, it may be the case that we fail to deliver accurate ascriptions of dispositions. The ascription of a
disposition is no guarantee of the truth of the ascription, just as the actuality of the disposition does not depend on
anything about our cognitive practices.
41
Millstein (2006) avoids talking about fitness directly. But much of the contents of her paper are certainly relevant
to discussions of fitness.
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See also Stern (2010) for a discussion of the epistatic effects of certain population features.
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poisonous type that predators tend to avoid, then the few that have developed that trait will likely
avoid predation somewhat successfully. But if too many within the population follow suit, the
immunity to predation is eroded, since it is no longer possible for the predators to target certain
coloring patterns and avoid the others (they must eat, after all). Thus Millstein claims that we
already have good precedent for thinking that population-level features are important in
evolutionary biology, so we can’t reject a priori the notion that it is populations themselves, and
not individuals, that undergo selection.
This seems plausible at first blush. If fitness is understood as a disposition toward the
successful production of offspring for future generations, then perhaps we should focus our
analysis on those features of populations that make it so that individuals are more likely to
successfully reproduce. The list of such possible features is difficult to exhaust, but plausibly
includes facts about reproduction schedules (see Godfrey-Smith 2009; Ariew & Lewontin,
2004), the degree of overlap between generations, certain behavior dynamics between
conspecifics (e.g. whether “communal parenting” is typical of a population), and environmental
facts about predation and the like (and specifically how this bears on likelihood of maturing to
viability) (see Brandon & Ramsey, 2007). While I don’t want argue that the population-level
features that Millstein identifies do not offer important causal contributions to the dynamics of
population change, I do want to note that populations should not be considered as the causal
ground of population change. The causal ground, rather, is found in biological individuals.

1.3.6 An analog disposition for populations
To see why this is so, recall that the disposition F of a biological individual is expressed by the
causal interactions between (f1, … , fn), where each fi is the fitness value for the traits of an
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organism O. F, I argued, does not depend on the value of any particular fi, since the
contributions of each fi is relative to the rest of the trait complex. The same goes for populations.
That is, we can suppose that there exists some disposition, like F, except that it applies to
populations instead of individuals. This would cast biological individuals as the rough
equivalents of the f-es in the analysis of F.
It might be argued that I’ve just shot my own argument in the figurative foot. If biological
individuals can be cast as broadly analogous to the f-es, then it looks like we have to say that
populations are causally foundational since we already claimed (with respect to individuals) that
the value of F does not depend on (nor is it analyzable in terms of) the f values. But if there’s
some disposition like F for populations, surely it does some of the work of mapping the
trajectory of population change, and so the natural conclusion is that populations should be
understood as the primary unit of analysis when considering the causal foundations of evolution.
It would be a mistake to suppose this. In the case of biological individuals, the disposition
F does not significantly depend on the discrete values of the f-es, but it is still the causal
interactions of the f-es that give F whatever causal potency it has. F cannot be reduced to
particular f values because of the manner in which the traits denoted by f values interact with one
another. The interactions are complex, relational, and can render certain causal effects suppressed
or promoted, however the case might have it. The case is similar, I argue, with respect to
populations and individuals. Serial epistatic effects, for instance, can occur at the level of
populations, such that the selective advantage of some trait might score lower than it otherwise
would have due to the countervailing force of certain other extant traits in a population (Stern,
2010, pp. 94-95).
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But just as in the case with individuals and their traits, the relevant population-level
disposition cannot be cashed out in terms of individuals not because it is not the individuals that
are doing the causal work, but rather because the relevant interactions are quite complex. Those
favoring a population-centric view of the causal process of evolution are perhaps warranted in
claiming that populations offer the best epistemic guide to change processes in evolution, since it
is plausibly the case that such change processes are more immediately apparent, empirically
speaking. Millstein (2006) seems to support something just like this notion that populations
constitute an epistemic guide when she discusses Rosenberg and Bouchard’s idea that fitness is
best analyzed in terms of relative pairwise comparisons of organisms in a population. To actually
carry such a procedure is practically impossible to be sure (unless you have a very small
population). Better to focus on populations, says Millstein, since at the population level we can
gain solid empirical and epistemic traction.
But of course I can grant this position and consistently hold that the real causal work (and
so the real explanatory work) is being done at the level of biological individuals. Before a
population can be disposed toward evolving in some particular way it must be the case that
individuals are disposed to occupy the functional roles that make possible the realization of the
relevant population-level feature. Even if we can grant that the functional space provided by
higher-level biological objects (populations, local ecologies, etc.) is somehow analytically prior
to the individuals that realize them43—and so make possible the truthful ascriptions of certain
attendant higher-level dispositions—it would be odd to claim that the higher-level objects are
causally prior. This, it seems, would require something of a move toward teleological reasoning
43

See, for instance, Trevor Pearce (2010) Pearce understands Darwin to have seen something like a notion of
analytic priority with respect to the “places” in nature’s economy, where the places are already fixed elements of the
ecological background. While this explains the conceptual space of possibilities for an increasingly diversified
ecological system, the economy of nature should not, I take it, be interpreted as having any fundamental causal
power. Causal powers are the province of organisms, not the conceptual space they occupy.
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in biological domains, and so is probably best rejected. Returning to the example of densitydependent selection, it would be odd to claim that certain density-dependent population features
are evolutionarily advantageous, and so cause individuals to evolve in such a way as to make
manifest that population feature. We should instead say that certain population-level features are
evolutionarily advantageous (perhaps for both populations and individuals), and then turn our
attention to those lower-level biological processes that make possible their realization. In the
case of mimicry, we should not say that facts about population density explain the emergence of
a propensity to evolve certain color characteristics. A population-level analysis would at best
explain why we take it to be the case that the selective advantage conferred by certain mimetic
abilities is dependent on facts about population dependency. But this is a non-causal analysis.
Biological individuals and their attendant dispositions do the causal work.

1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued for a realist construal of dispositions as causally active in evolutionary
biology, specifically with respect to fitness. I first sketched a realist account of dispositions in
general, and then showed why such an account is of the right sort for fitness as a causal
component of evolutionary change. The account of fitness that I argued for is one that takes the
holistic fitnesses of biological individuals as central to the causal framework of evolutionary
biology. This is against accounts that would take populations and population structures as the
main unit of analysis for a causal account of evolutionary change.
In the next chapter I defend dispositional realism with respect to evolvability. In the same
way that I’ve argued for fitness as a real property of organisms, the close examination of which
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assists us in clarifying our understanding of causal processes in population change, I argue that
evolvability is a real property of organisms that plays an analogous explanatory role.
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2. EVOLVABILITY: A FURTHER CASE STUDY FOR
DISPOSITIONAL REALISM
In the previous chapter I argued that a realist stance toward dispositions in biology helps us to
make sense of evolutionary change. This is especially the case, I argued, with respect to fitness.
But the explanatory power of dispositional realism is not specific to fitness. In this chapter I will
argue that a similar case can be made for dispositional realism as regards evolvability.44 In this
chapter I will argue, indeed, that dispositional realism is the best stance to take toward
evolvability as a property of organisms, and that this counts as further evidence in support of
dispositions as causally central to the life sciences.45
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: in (§2.1) I will review some of the
scientific and philosophical literature on evolvability. This is mainly in order to gain some
descriptive and analytical clarity with respect to what evolvability is, since the literature on it is
young and different treatments often appear mutually incompatible. Having gone over some of
the literature on evolvability and its various construals in (§2.1), I will spend (§2.2) developing
and defending a functionalist conception of evolvability, casting it as a multiply realizable
dispositional property of organisms (and possibly populations, too). In (§2.3) I deal with some
objections. Some will object to the idea that evolvability can be treated as a distinct phenomenon
in its own right, while others might object to the functionalist interpretation that I aim to give. I
will treat each sort of objection in turn. In (§2.4) I offer some concluding remarks.
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I’ll be referring to Massimo Pigliucci’s (2008) review piece quite a bit in this chapter. For a thorough review of
competing views on evolvability, I refer the reader to him.
45
This is to say that chapters one and two gesture toward a cumulative case in favor of dispositional realism.
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2.1 Evolvability: the lay of the land
It is generally agreed that evolvability—however else one might wish to think about it—is
concerned with explicating that property of organisms and populations that makes them more
likely to evolve (Brown 2014; Pigliucci 2008; Wagner & Draghi 2010). It may be comparatively
easy for chimpanzees as opposed to macaques, for instance, to evolve the necessary musculature
structure for bipedal locomotion, and this will have to do with certain properties that
chimpanzees have and macaques lack. That said, there is not, as of now, a widely accepted,
general account of what precisely evolvability is.46 In general, the debate seems to have
something to do with what we ought to identify as the right unit of analysis with respect to
evolvability, and not so much a debate over the definition of the concept as such (Pigliucci 2008,
76-77). It is worth noting, though, that the relevant property is taken to be largely independent of
natural selection (and so plausibly independent of fitness and the like). That is, when it is
claimed that an organismal type, or population, or species is highly evolvable, this is supposed to
be a substantially different question than, say, whether a type (etc.) has been acted upon by
selective forces.47 Usually evolvability is understood as having to do (at least primarily) with the
ease with which an organism can move through morphological or phenotypic space, and clearly
this need not have anything to do with fitness. Returning to the example above, it may be that
chimpanzees are more evolvable than macaques as regards bipedalism, but that can be true even
if selection has never worked on chimpanzees in such a way as to make that novelty appear.
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See Pigliucci (2008) and Wagner & Draghi (2010). It’s interesting to note that the authors writing on this subject
all seem to recognize both some measure of disagreement and some manner of core conceptual similarity.
47
There’s some disagreement over what, exactly, this should be taken to mean (contrast Brown (2014), Love (2003),
and Pigliucci (2008)), but it’s generally agreed that evolvability concepts at least serve as something like special
conditions that selective powers can manipulate. Clearly, then, pretty much everyone agrees that evolvability is
different than fitness and the like.
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2.1.1 Genetics: the G and M matrices
If it’s generally agreed, then, that evolvability is concerned with identifying and analyzing which
properties make it more likely that a type should evolve, what exactly is there to disagree about?
Pigliucci (2008) identifies a few strains of disagreement. A particularly noteworthy source of
disagreement is centered on whether evolvability, as a property, can be related to population
genetics in such a way as to make transitions from standard selection-based analysis of
populations to analysis of their evolvability more or less seamless. That is, there are some that
argue evolvability requires only a relatively minor expansion of scope with respect to the
questions that contemporary quantitative methods in population genetics aims to handle. The
semi-classical conception of evolvability is due to R.A. Fisher (1930) and his introduction of
standing genetic variation as an evolution-conducive property of populations. Here the notion is
just that more variation within the genetic makeup of a population will make it such that that
population is more responsive to selection pressures where they arise. Note that standing
variation is understood to make populations more responsive to selection, meaning that standing
variation in a population is in some sense independent of selection effects. Somewhat more
recently, biologists have developed more precise methods for modeling the change in standing
genetic variation within populations by use of the G-matrix formalization (Roff 2000; Wagner &
Draghi 2010). Avoiding as many of the technical details as possible (since the G-matrix
formalization is not really the topic of this chapter), the G-matrix is a multivariate regression
model that predicts the amount of additive variation that a population can be expected to display
given changes in mutation rate, gene recombination rate, migration rate, selection intensity, and
the like.48
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This will obviously involve some manner of idealization, since it’s probably not possible to rule out all of the
signal confounding effects that are likely to occur in the complex interactions of biological components. But even
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Moving a bit past this semi-classical, neo-Fisherian method for representing evolvability,
biologists have tried to use similar methods for modeling variability in populations (Wagner &
Draghi 2010). Whereas standing variation is a measure of the available genetic variation for
selection to work on, variability is understood to express the ability to vary. Formally, variability
is “the amount of additive genetic variation created for a trait by a mutation [within] a
generation” (Lynch & Walsh 1998). That is, regression models (here using the “M-matrix,”
which uses different input variables than the G-matrix mentioned above) employed for the
prediction of variability values are attempting to correctly predict the amount of variation that a
particular mutation will create with respect to the trait associated with the mutated gene. We can
imagine, for instance, a particular gene that’s thought to be associated with height. If there were a
genetic mutation in a particular generation that caused a duplication of that gene, and later the
expression of that duplicate contributed to increased variation in height, we would say that the
mutation accounted for a positive contribution to the variability of the population.

2.1.2 Beyond the G and M matrices
Recently, the study of evolvability has grown beyond analysis of variation and variability and the
regression models deployed in their representation and analysis. Wagner and Altenberg (1996)
provide an analysis of what they call “the representation problem.” The representation problem
has to do with the G→P (Genotype→Phenotype) map.49 Here researchers are interested in the
evolution of complex systems (often computer-based), and more specifically the dependence of

so, these models are pretty fine-grained, and so warrant some epistemic respect (see Griswold, 2006). For an indepth critical review of G and it’s uses, see Pigliucci and Kaplan (2010), chapter 4.
49
The genotype is just the genetic constitution of an organism. The phenotype is the set of observable traits or
characteristics of an organism. The G→P map is basically a schematic that attempts to analyze how changes in the
genotype map to changes in the phenotype.
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evolvability on the way genetic variation maps onto phenotypic variation.50 In order for a
complex system (like an organism) to be considered properly evolvable, it must be the case
(according to Wagner and Altenberg)51 that genetic variation sometimes results in phenotypic
improvement. A proper account of how this occurs requires a deeper understanding of the
structural and functional architecture that characterizes the relationship between genotype and
phenotype (Wagner & Altenberg 1996; Pigliucci 2008).
Two major research themes in the more recent studies of evolvability have been
robustness and modularity. Robustness is typically linked to neutralist theories of evolution.52
The idea is just that mutations can accumulate in certain ‘neutral spaces’ in the G→P map.
Mutations occurring in the neutral spaces of the map have no effect on the phenotype, allowing
organisms to accumulate mutational variants of genes (often through gene duplication) for
selection to work on at a later time, once the neutral region becomes expressed (perhaps as a
result of a change to a regulatory section of the genome), and thus making the organism more
evolvable (see Stern 2010).53
Modularity is usually linked specifically to developmental pathways in organisms. A
modular organism is one that is organized in such a way that different parts of its developmental
architecture are (at least partially) independent of one another. A relatively simple example
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For a lucid explanation of this “representation problem,” see Wagner and Altenberg (1996). Pigliucci (2010) is a
good source, too, this time in the context of “phenotypic plasticity.” The problem, broadly speaking, is just dealing
with questions of how we can make sense of the claim that genetic information “translates” to trait features manifest
in the phenotype. The correlation is strong, and we’ve known this at least since the Modern Synthesis. But Wagner
and Altenberg (1996) and Pigliucci (2010) show that the mapping is pretty far from one-to-one, even if it’s pretty
strong. Studies of plastic phenotypes, for instance, demonstrate that the phenotype can vary somewhat independently
of changes in the genotype.
51
It’s a matter of some controversy whether evolvability must involve beneficial phenotypic change or not. Ability
to change simplicter may be sufficient (see Brown, 2014).
52
See Masatoshi Nei (2013) for a paradigmatic example of such a view.
53
Stern (2008) argues that mutations to cis-regulatory regions are essential to morphological change since they can
alter the manner in which genes are expressed without rendering gene products non-functional. See Chapter 7,
“Pathworks.”
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would involve an organism that’s evolved to have developmental tasks segregated to two
separate modules (say, one module for the trunk and another for the extremities). The idea is just
that the effects of mutations occurring in Trunk Module, say, are largely confined to Trunk
Module, and likewise with Extremities Module (Sansom 2008, 141). Modularity is thought to be
conducive to evolvability since modularity helps to downplay the effects of pleiotropy.54
Pleiotropic effects are typically seen as a constraint on an organism’s ability to move through
phenotypic space. Since genetic and developmental links are a source of pleiotropic effects, a
mutation affecting the expression of trait T1 in the G→P map will also likely affect the
expression of T2, and these pleiotropic effects are constraining and largely detrimental, overall.
By decoupling traits through segregation into largely non-interacting developmental networks,
selection is free to work on different traits separately and at different rates, enhancing the space
of possible phenotypic variation (Brown 2014; Stern 2010).55 The conceptual underpinnings of
modularity and its relationship to evolution and evolvability are in some sense tied to the older
notion of “mosaic evolution” (see Mayr 1997, 230). Mosaic evolution is the idea that different
parts (especially molecular parts) of organisms have evolved at different rates given different
selection intensities in different epochs. Mosaic evolution was seen as largely conjectural in the
1950s and 1960s when Mayr and others were writing about it (see Mayr 1982; Mayr 1997), but
contemporary studies of organismal modularity seem to offer a mechanism through which
something like mosaic evolution can be roughly corroborated.
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See footnote 36 from Chapter 1 of this thesis.
William Wimsatt has a well-known position that’s relevant to the discussion here. His view is called the “Theory
of Generative Entrenchment” (Wimsatt, 1986), which holds that once a successful biological developmental strategy
has been realized, it is really quite difficult for an organism to develop an alternative strategy without doing
catastrophic harm to the organism. Mutations that promote developmental segregation may suggest a fruitful
approach to getting around this well-known problem.
55
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2.1.3 Summing up
These are the major areas of research on evolvability in the contemporary scientific (and, to a
lesser degree, philosophical)56 literature. There are some other, relatively minor studies on the
links between phenotypic plasticity and evolvability (see Piglicucci 2010) and also some rather
heterodox work on the (supposed) link between “The Baldwin Effect” and evolvability (see
Weber 2013).57 These, however, are sufficiently peripheral so as to justify being left to the side
for a study such as this.

2.2 Building the functionalist case
Scant philosophical analysis on evolvability has been done as of now. What little work has been
done seems to agree, with little controversy, that evolvability, whatever it is, is to be understood
as a disposition (see Brown 2014; Sansom 2008). This should not strike the reader as particularly
surprising. We’ve already said, after all, that the property of evolvability has to do with an
ability; namely, the ability of an organismal type to move through morphological/phenotypic
space. There is, however, a potential problem here. As Pigliucci (2008) and Brown (2014) are
careful to point out, the available work on evolvability makes it look as though the concept of
evolvability isn’t really sufficiently unified so as to warrant something like a notion of the
concept of evolvability. Instead, it looks like we may have something of a loose clustering of
different concepts that have been somewhat artificially grouped together under the moniker of
“evolvability.” Geneticists have their concepts encoded by the M and G matrices, developmental
biologists have their concepts associated with pathways and networks, and theoretical biologists
56

Love (2003) and Brown (2014) are probably the two most thorough philosophical treatments of evolvability to
date. Philosophy of biology, in general, is really just now catching up to the newly developed concepts within the
‘Extended Synthesis.’ See Pigliucci and Müller (eds.) (2010).
57
Weber argues that novel behaviors may increase the propensity of a population to evolve in a particular direction.
His case studies are speculative and merit little mention.
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have their neutralist theories along with “exaptation” and “co-optation” effects.58 The causal
components underlying these different analyses of evolvability don’t seem to have all that much
in common (at least as regards their concrete causal machinery).
Alan Love (2003) and Pigliucci (2008) argue that what’s needed is more refinement. That
is, we should apply careful analysis to the different conceptual regions of the cluster concept
“evolvability,” and break it up into other, individually named concepts that perhaps partially
overlap (see Brown 2014, 550). Brown (2014) thinks that this is the wrong approach. Instead, we
should treat evolvability as a “broad-based disposition” with robust explanatory power. My view
is closer to Brown than to Love or Pigliucci (but more on this later).

2.2.1 Brown on explanatory robustness
Let’s take a look at what Brown has in mind when she talks about “robust” explanations. Brown
argues (in a fairly uncontroversial manner) that selection-based explanations are
paradigmatically robust. Why? The reason is that selection-based explanations don’t offer
explanations of only the actual evolutionary pathway from one place in phenotypic space to
another, but also other possible pathways.59 Her case study involves the emergence of limb
diversity in later primates.60 If the target state in phenotypic space is more limb length diversity,
then a selection-based explanation is robust in the sense that it can tell you how the outcome
would differ had there been differences in selection intensity, mutation rate, migration,
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For a very clear and engaging discussion on exaptation and co-optation, see Stephen J. Gould and Elisabeth Vrba,
“Exaptation—A Missing Term,” in The Philosophy of Biology, eds. David Hull and Michael Ruse (New York;
Oxford UP, 1998). Briefly, exaptation (or co-optation—they’re used pretty interchangeably) is the phenomenon
whereby certain organic structures evolved for one use, and then through (often neutral) mutations, that feature is
subsequently co-opted into some other functional role. This appears to be fairly common in certain types of bacteria.
59
For a tangentially related corollary on the topic of fitness, see Grant Ramsey (2006). Ramsey argues that a proper
explanation of fitness involves not just actually realized fitnesses, but also possibly realized fitnesses.
60
For more on the case study, see Young, Wagner, and Hallgrimsson (2010), “Serial Homology and the Evolution of
Mammalian Limb Covariation Structure,” Evolution (59).
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recombination, duplication, and the like. The target space denoted by more limb length diversity
involves more than one possible outcome, and selection-based arguments explain how different
regions of the target space might have been hit given a counterfactual analysis of evolutionary
forces working on complex systems.61 Brown contrasts such robust selection-based explanations
with “lineage explanations” from developmental biology, which she characterizes as non-robust.
A lineage explanation is largely descriptive, explaining how biological components have in fact
developed to facilitate an organism’s movement from one location in phenotype space to another.
On this sort of explanation it is only the actual pathway that’s explained, meaning (according to
Brown) that such explanations lack robustness.

2.2.2 Making evolvability explanations robust
According to Brown, we can unify the disparate conceptions of evolvability described by
Pigliucci (2008) and others by imposing a bit of formalization onto this family of concepts, and
by doing so we transform this cluster concept into a form of robust explanation.62 The formal
representation of the disposition x is evolvable, for Brown, takes the form:
E: Pr (ft | x & b)63
Here x is some proposition describing the population of interest, b describes the relevant
environmental parameters that provide the evolutionary context for the population, ft is a timeindexed possible outcome of interest for the population x, and E is the probability of the
realization of ft given the truth of x and b (Brown 2014, 563). For Brown, x can involve whatever
population features you like, and b can represent any of a number of relevant environmental
factors. Her treatment is meant to be a formal, robust method of explanation, and as such she
61

Brown (2014, p. 557).
Ibid.
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Brown (2014) writes it E: Prx, b(ft)
62
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need not be concerned with whether the relevant population features are of the kind studied by
population geneticists, or those studied by developmental evolutionary biologists.64 Whatever is
relevant to the explanation is fair game as regards inputs for her formalization. This is what
Brown means, I take it, when she says that evolvability is a “broad-based” disposition (Brown
2014, 550). What’s unclear, though, is whether she means to argue that evolvability is just one
disposition, or instead a family of dispositions that can be formalized in the same way. It seems to
me she is claiming something closer to the latter, whereas I will argue that evolvability is just one
disposition, though a multiply realizable one.
I think my characterization of Brown is a fair one, given that she seems focused on
evolvability as a kind of explanation rather than evolvability as a property of organisms. Further,
she refers to the causal bases of evolvability as something like a family of categorical properties
that in turn cause the disposition x is evolvable.65

2.2.3 Evolvability as a unified, causal disposition
In §1.2.1 I noted that the distinction between categorical bases and the dispositions they
purportedly cause is itself a questionable ontological bifurcation. A defensible position holds that
dispositions are identical to their categorical bases, to the effect that what are usually called
“categorical bases” are in fact just dispositions themselves (see Mumford 1998, 93-116). Nancy
Cartwright (2015) also seems to claim, in the same vein as Mumford, that dispositions (or
capacities, in her own vernacular) are all that’s really there (at least in terms of base-level causal
explanations).
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This is to say that her account can take the components of the G and M matrices as relevant inputs, and this need
not be to the exclusion of developmental constraints. Both can be treated, whether separately or together.
65
Brown (2014, p. 561).
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Evolvability plausibly offers a case in support of the notion of dispositions as causally
potent, and in some sense identical to their categorical bases. It’s unclear to what extent my own
view is a departure from Brown. Her seeming commitment to the categorical/dispositional
property distinction certainly suggests that she thinks of dispositions as descriptive or analytical
and not properly causal. Relatedly, one might wonder whether I can claim a genuine causal role
for a disposition like evolvability, since what’s been described so far appears broadly abstract.
Strategies and causal structures are fine as far as they go, but they don’t seem to fit the bill as the
kinds of things that cause events to happen in the world.
But my claim is that strategies and structures are directly related to concrete facts about
organisms and what it is that makes them able to evolve. The conditional probability of organism
O’s hitting a particular region of morphological space could be enhanced by a mutation in some
cis-regulatory region of its genome, say. It’s conceivable that such a mutation does two things
simultaneously: such a mutation might, for instance, both loosen certain developmental
constraints, enhancing modularity, and also increase the amount of standing variation or future
variability within a population, creating a disposition to respond to selection pressures. There is,
then, an increase in the available strategies through which morphological change might happen,
though it may never come about such change in fact occurs. Even so, the organism still holds the
disposition of evolvability, and this disposition may be realized in terms of any one of the
strategies available to it. The disposition holds in virtue of the functional states described by the
strategies that an organism may possibly realize. So, I argue, we have a case of a single, multiply
realizable disposition.
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Whichever strategy is realized, we are ultimately concerned with the same end state for
the system; namely, whether it hits some target space (morphologically).66 The biological facts
(which are themselves dispositional), then, fix a further disposition by opening up evolutionary
strategies and thereby increasing the conditional probability that the type will move successfully
through morphological space; namely, the disposition x is evolvable. Any one of the strategies
may be realized, though none need be.

2.2.4 Some clarifications on functionalist strategies
Contemporary analytic philosophy is rife with debate over functionalism. In the philosophy of
mind and philosophy of cognitive science, for instance, there’s a great deal of debate over
whether “function” can be analyzed independently of the medium within which a function
operates. Thomas Polger (2004) holds that no sense can be made of this notion of “medium
independent” functions, since functions perform or fail to perform at least in part as a result of
the physical context of their operation. But I think the common objections to functionalist
theories fail to apply in this context. In the case of evolvability the property that I’m describing is
one that holds in virtue of evolutionary strategies, some (or most) of which will not be realized,
and so the functionally characterized disposition of evolvability does not hold merely in virtue of
physical properties. If, as in the above paragraph, we think about evolvability in terms of
mutations that increase available strategies for moving through morphological space, then the
explanation is part physical and part functional. The mutation (and perhaps a physically realized
strategy) accounts for the physical part of the explanation, where the rest is cashed out in terms
of a functional space of open strategies.
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See the diagram on p. 557 of Brown (2014).
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This is, perhaps, an odd claim. Surely the evolvability of any extant organismal type is to
be analyzed in terms of its biological features; namely, whether it’s sufficiently modular, whether
there exists the requisite variation, whether the genomes in question are sufficiently robust, etc.
This is true, but we may be allowed to distinguish between the evolvability of, say, Charlie the
Tuna, and evolvability in general. This point is supported, I take it, by Brown’s claim that
explanations appealing to evolvability (or at least her formalization of it) are robust. That
evolvability is a robust concept implies that there are many strategies for hitting a particular
target region in morphological space. My functionalist-oriented claim, then, is that there are
many causal structures that that facilitate evolvability, and these may severally realize the
functional aims67 of evolvability as a property of organisms.

2.3 Objections and replies
Having outlined my favored position, I’ll now shift my focus to some possible objections. The
first objection has to do with the status of evolvability as a biological phenomenon in general,
and the other has to do with the functionalist approach that I outline in (§2.2). As to the status of
evolvability as a biological phenomenon, it may be objected that evolvability does not describe
anything that is not already covered by the traditional toolkit of population genetics. That is, it
may be argued that arguments about evolvability just collapse into arguments about natural
selection and the like. As for my functionalist account of evolvability, it may be argued (as has
been alluded to already) that the failure of functionalism in other domains means that it can’t be a
viable approach here either. I will take each of these in turn.
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I don’t mean anything teleological by the word “aims.” I mean only that there are causal, functional roles in
biological domains with respect to biological organisms, and these are well explained by selected effects and the
like.
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2.3.1 Evolvability is not a distinct phenomenon
The first objection is that evolvability is not a genuine biological phenomenon. Rather, it is just a
special case of other sorts of biological phenomena, like natural selection. The objection from
natural selection is especially pressing in Brown’s case, since part of her formalization involves
an environmental parameter.68 Her formalization is supposed to tell us the probability of a
population realizing some future morphological state given certain facts about the population and
its environment. This sounds a lot like natural selection. It’s generally agreed, however, that a
proper account of evolvability must be one that’s contextualized to the organism’s environment.
Any other kind of account seems either empty or else unnatural (perhaps like some combination
of orthogenesis and ideal morphology69). Brown (2014) suggests one possible solution to this
problem, whereby our environment-involving propositions are sufficiently fine-grained so as to
exclude the environmental factors that would act as selection pressures. This would be difficult
to do in many cases. Brown notes, for instance, that temperature can affect evolvability by
altering mutation rates, but it’s also a well-known form of selection pressure.70 But if we can
recognize that the effects of temperature (and other difficult environmental parameters) may be
multiple, it’s reasonable to claim that we can use something like Brown’s approach (whereby we
make the environment-involving propositions more fine-grained) and contextualize the
environment-involving propositions to the specific effects that we’re interested in. So, if we
restrict our analysis to how temperature affects mutation rates in a population rather than how
temperature affects the population overall, we don’t run afoul of the selectionist’s objection.71
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Parsing non-selective response to the environment is really quite tricky. Intuitively, we think that natural selection
just is the response of an organism to the environment. Early precursors to theories of biological evolution seem to
hold to something quite like this notion (see Richards, 2002 pp. 216-229). See also Love (2003).
69
See Peter Bowler (1992).
70
See Sterenly (2007).
71
See Brown (2014, p. 567).
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Setting aside natural selection, it might be claimed that evolvability is just a special case
of certain genetic processes, even if they’re not directly related to selection processes. That is,
perhaps there’s no special property called “evolvability” over and above the mutational process
that makes certain biological structures manifest in the world. The claim, then, would be that it
isn’t so much the case that some populations evolve more, but instead they just happen to change
more thanks to the random walk of biological change.72 But Pigliucci (2008) points out that
experimental evidence from E. coli studies suggests that evolvability can actually be selected for.
Certain structures within bacteria seem to be able to accumulate a higher number of neutral
mutations, enhancing their overall robustness. When selection pressures are applied in laboratory
settings, the bacterial variants with higher robustness values appeared to have a selective
advantage over their less robust counterparts.73 A deeper analysis of the implications of these
findings is beyond the scope of this chapter, but this example (and the biological literature more
generally) seems to demonstrate that the advocate of mutation-driven evolution has a hard time
explaining experimental results such as this.

2.3.2 Objections to the functionalist case
Finally it may be claimed that the functionalist account that I give, which implies that
evolvability is one, multiply realizable disposition fails given the strong reasons to doubt the
success of such a strategy in other domains (most notably philosophy of mind).74 Thomas Polger
(2004) has argued that there’s no good reason to think that different physical tokens realize a
unified type. What we have, rather, are distinct physical systems, each of which reduce locally to
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This would be the picture offered by Nei (2013), for instance.
See James Shapiro (2011).
74
See Kim (2011), Chapter 6 for a fairly detailed survey of the standard objections to functionalist theories of mind.
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their microphysical constituents.75 Any claim that some unified type is realized by different
physical systems (human beings and extraterrestrial beings with a silicon-based biology, say) is
just an argument from analogy gone terribly astray. If the local reduction strategy is successful,
then it seems the best we’re left with is evolvability as a cluster concept in need of refinement
into multiple dispositions, as suggested by Love (2003).
It’s unclear how much force Polger’s local reductions (or some similar strategy) can
really have against the functionalist portrayal of evolvability. The biological facts affirm that
evolvability, as a capacity, really can be accounted for by appeal to a fairly wide array of causal
processes. Even as the causal mechanisms vary, the ability that we’re attempting to describe is
the same in each case: the ability to move successfully through morphological space. The fact
that we can explain the same ability in terms of several causal processes serves to undercut any
objection to the effect that evolvability is not to be considered a unified type, and instead locally
reducible to other individuated processes. For the objection to stick one would have to
demonstrate that the several causal processes in question do not in fact confer the same ability to
the organism in question. It seems clear enough, however, that these several causal processes do
confer the same ability on organisms.

2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued for a realist construal of evolvability as a dispositional property of
organisms, and further that this disposition is functional and multiply realizable. This is against
treatments of evolvability that take it to be a “cluster concept,” meaning that evolvability doesn’t
name a distinct phenomenon, but instead a family of concepts that should be further clarified. I
found support in Rachael Brown’s (2014) treatment of evolvability. Although she appears
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ambiguous on the question of whether evolvability constitutes a single, unified dispositional
property, her work in formalizing explanations using evolvability concepts and in making
evolvability explanations sufficiently robust proved helpful for shaping my own thoughts on the
subject.
In the next chapter I turn to an alternative way of framing the metaphysical commitments
of science. Chapter 3 takes a look at Ontic Structural Realism, which is a view that understands
objects and dispositions of the sort that I’ve covered up to now as eliminable from our proper
ontological picture of the world. It should be clear from the first two chapters of this thesis that I
will urge the rejection of such a picture. Some of the reasons I give are related to what’s been
argued for already, and others are self-contained to the third chapter.
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3. OSR: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
AND A COUNTERARGUMENT
In chapters one and two I argued that dispositions, realistically construed, are important for
understanding some of the core concepts and phenomena in evolutionary biology: namely, fitness
and evolvability. Recent literature in the metaphysics of science, however, involves a great deal
of discussion and analysis concerning Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), and advocates of OSR
claim that a careful analysis of our best fundamental physics seems to obviate any need for an
appeal to dispositions (see Ladyman & Ross, 2007 pp. 190-6; French, 2014 pp. 238-45). How is
such a claim to be understood? Surely normal empirical science (as in a laboratory or out in the
field) relies quite heavily on the idea that we can reliably track dispositions.76 If we want to know
if a particular organism or population is evolvable, we answer the question by examining certain
properties of the organism or population in question (see Chapter 2). If we want to know how a
particular enzyme affects the rate of chemical reaction at a certain active protein site in cell
biology, we manipulate certain properties of the genes controlling protein catalysts. Science
involves the measurement of properties, and at least some of these properties are dispositional. If
the OSR defender is to somehow explain away these properties she is going to have to tell a very
convincing story.
The defender of OSR, as I will describe below, is arguing against the inclusion of
dispositions in our ontology (causal or otherwise) mainly because OSR implies the elimination
of ordinary objects, and ordinary objects (frogs, sugar, leaves, etc.) are those things that possess
dispositions.77 This is to say that because the metaphysical theory on offer under OSR implies
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that there are no objects (and instead only “structures”), there are no things that can hold
properties, and so it follows that there are no dispositions (see French, 2014 pp. 245-52). I will
give two arguments against OSR’s eliminative aims. The first is that their position would make
the success of the majority of scientific practices utterly mysterious. Here I find staunch allies in
the likes of Nancy Cartwright and Anjan Chakravartty,78 and I hope to add some strength to the
case their cumulative works have already set forth. An instructive question with respect to this
argument would be something like the following: How much metaphysics is necessary for
making sense of scientific practice? I will argue that dispositions are indispensable to the task of
making sense of scientific practice (in biology especially), and so the defender of OSR has a lot
to answer for.
The second argument is more difficult, though probably the more philosophically
interesting of the two. The defender of OSR is arguing that the elimination of objects implies the
elimination of dispositions. A key premise in her argument (as we will see) is that permutation
invariant maps in fundamental physics serve to undercut any primitive notion of identity, and so
undercut any primitive notion of object-hood. I will argue that this inference is illicit in two ways
(and the second way is of particular importance where my broader position is concerned): (1) it
presupposes that we can legitimately “read off” our metaphysical commitments more or less
directly from fundamental physics. This, I argue, is problematically naïve in ways that I’ll
mention in detail in the relevant section. (2) It presupposes that metaphysics is domain general.
That is, the defender of OSR seems to have it that lack of identity (and so lack of object-hood) in
fundamental physics implies lack of identity (and so lack of object-hood) in chemistry, biology,

“structural change” as a sufficiently good causal notion, which is I discuss briefly in the main text.
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and all the rest.79 I will argue that there are strong reasons to doubt this (partly on the basis of
what’s already been said in chapters one and two).
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: in (§3.1) I briefly go over the basic
argument from OSR. I will draw more from Steven French (2014) than from other sources in the
literature, mainly because French has given the clearest and most convincing case for OSR.
There are slight differences between French and other OSR adherents, such as James Ladyman,
Don Ross, and Alyssa Ney,80 but the core of French’s version seems to capture the central
commitments of the view as a whole, and this suffices for my purposes. In (§3.2) I offer my
argument from scientific practice; in (§3.3) I argue against the central metaphysical claim of
OSR, specifically to the effect that the defender of OSR is guilty of illicit inference; and in (§3.4)
I offer some brief concluding remarks.

3.1 Ontic structural realism on objects and dispositions
The basic metaphysical intuition that the world is populated by objects, and that these objects in
turn stand in certain relations to one another hardly seems disputable—at least at first glance.81
According to the defender of OSR, this sort of “first glance” metaphysics crumbles under deeper
inspection, especially as one begins to take the findings of contemporary physics sufficiently
seriously. James Ladyman and Don Ross (2007) refer to the classical, a prioristic methods of
metaphysical analysis as “Neo-Scholastic” metaphysics. They see contemporary analytic
metaphysics as largely the province of bookish schoolmen that haven’t paid near enough
attention to the methods and findings of our best contemporary science, much like the
79
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Scholastics of the pre-enlightenment age. It follows, on their view, that work in analytic
metaphysics does not make any meaningful contact with reality.82 Better, they think, to see how
metaphysical commitments can essentially just be “read off” of our most fundamental current
science; namely, fundamental physics.
Before moving much further, I want to note that I won’t be treating the difficult topic of
how best to understand the notion of structure at play in OSR. Others have dealt with these
problems already, and I see no reason to recapitulate the recent history of that literature here.83
Instead, the defender of OSR can help herself to whatever manner of structural notions she likes,
and I’ll focus my analysis on OSR’s treatment of object-hood (and dispositions, by implication).

3.1.1 The argument from permutation invariance
Whatever account of structure the defender of OSR is to give,84 there is broad-based agreement
(among OSR advocates) that our best-confirmed theories from fundamental physics imply the
elimination of objects from our ontology. The best argument for why the elimination of objects
follows from OSR is seen in Steven French’s The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and
Representation (2014).85 According to French, group theoretic presentations of fundamental
physical systems constitute the best means we have for analyzing the ontological implications of
fundamental physics.86 Group theory, as it applies to physics, tells us that quantum statistical
states are broadly permutation invariant (French, 2014 pp. 34-35). A simple example might
involve a quantum system of, say, two elementary particles (say bosons). If we describe the
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system as having one boson on the left and one boson on the right, then intuitively, if we were to
apply a transformation function that takes the left-sided boson to the right side and the rightsided boson to the left, we would expect that the mapping function gives two possible
configurations of the system (the map plus the flip-map).87 Counterintuitively enough, there’s
really just one configuration; that is, such a map is permutation invariant. Fundamental physics,
posed in terms of group theoretic transformations, has no way of individuating this boson from
that boson. Bosons (electrons, leptons, etc.) appear not to have haecceities. The key intuition that
this is meant to undercut—at least for our purposes—is the notion that the world is comprised of
tiny individuatable objects, and that these objects are engaged in an extended series of “microbangings” that would support our intuitions concerning the fundamental causal dispositions of
things (see Ladyman & Ross, 2007 pp. 7-27; Dyke & MacLauren, 2012).
In the philosophy of science (especially metaphysics of science), objects are typically
defended on the basis of their indispensable role in causal explanations (see Chakravartty, 2003;
Psillos, 2006). Without objects, it seems difficult to make much sense of causal relations, since
our typical notion of causal relations involves the interactions of objects in space and time (see
French, 2014 p. 212). French contends, however, that this need be no worry for the structural
realist. Cast in structural terms, the things we usually think of as objects can be still be treated as
such for all practical purposes (typical linguistic exchanges and the like). But we ought not be
deceived into thinking that the things we typically construe as the “objects” involved in a causal
series are anything like objects as typically conceived (French, 2014 pp. 99-100). Instead, objects
are just nodes within structures, and the nodes themselves decompose into structures once
properly analyzed.88 There are just structures all the way down, and any talk in terms of objects
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is merely pragmatic. There are causal relations, but nothing like causal “powers” that the “objectoriented realist” (French, 2014, p. 14) might prefer. Objects and their dispositions are nowhere to
be found in the group theoretic symmetries of fundamental physics, and so it follows that they’re
nowhere to be found in general. Instead, causal relationships involve only a change in the
relational structure of the system under investigation.89 Causation involves nothing more than
structural change.

3.1.2 Summing up
The fact that quantum systems appear permutation invariant under transformations and that the
defender of OSR is still able to save causation (in a manner of speaking) seems to bode well for
the view. Permutation invariance seems to support the structuralist contention that there are no
objects. The key objection is posed in terms of the need for causal properties (like dispositions)
to make sense of causal processes and relations, but the structural realist appears to have an
answer. Furthermore, the structuralist takes his position to be well motivated: OSR maps onto
contemporary physics better than opposing views, and we should develop our metaphysics to
reflect our best fundamental physics as much as possible (Ladyman & Ross, 2007 pp. 27-38). If
contemporary physics dispenses with any need of objects and dispositions then it is on the
object/dispositional realist to say how we might be justified in keeping them, according to the
structural realist.90
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3.2 Metaphysics meets practice
The history of science seems to have taught us time and again that “common sense” (whatever
one should take that to mean) cannot be trusted. Special relativity cuts against our common sense
conceptions of time and simultaneity; general relativity cuts against our common sense
conception of the geometry of space; evolutionary biology cuts against the common sense
explanations on offer for things like human behaviors and mental content. It’s small wonder then
that scientists and philosophers of science are often wont to warn caution when they see a
metaphysician arguing for a particular view of reality’s contents on the basis of “intuition” or
“common sense” (Dyke & MacLauren, 2012). Science just tells a much different story than the
one told by common sense—or this seems to be so at least often enough to warrant skepticism
with respect to the epistemic probity of common sense.
French (2014)91 and others (see Ladyman & Ross, 2007)92 argue that explanations in
terms of objects, dispositions and the like in the special sciences have at best something like
heuristic value. So, the special scientist, according to OSR, is engaged in producing something
like common sense explanations in the same way that one might spin common sense
explanations of behaviors and beliefs. In the same way that the cognitive sciences may suggest
that cognitive mechanisms don’t support such common sense stories, the OSR defender says
physics doesn’t support the ontological offerings of the cognitive scientist. Object speak in the
special sciences is pragmatic, but has no claim to ontological import.93
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3.2.1 Against a generalized attack on “common sense”
There are good reasons to doubt that this generalized attack on common sense holds in the case
of scientific practice as it relates to the special sciences. As Nancy Cartwright (2015) points out,
the fundamental warrant for appealing to objects and their dispositions (or “powers” as she calls
them) is basically empirical. That is, we appeal to explanations in terms of the powers of objects
because when we observe the world carefully in scientific contexts, objects display arrangementsensitive powers that we can manipulate.94 Far from an obscure, occult manner of metaphysical
enterprise, Cartwright (2015, pp. 1-3) argues that a metaphysics involving the powers of objects
according to their “canonical operations” is justified in virtue of its “this worldly” character.
Anjan Chakravartty (1998) argues similarly that objects and dispositions are quite
important to the basic process of empirical discovery. As an example he cites the well-known
case of the Fresnel-Maxwell transition in the study of the behavior of light. This case study has
been put to much use in the history and philosophy of science, and to great effect in John
Worrall’s seminal 1989 paper, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Worrall offers a
structural explanation of the shift. Here the relevant notion of structure is cashed out in terms of
the representative mathematical equations. Worrall shows that Fresnel’s equations for wave
optics can be derived from Maxwell’s equations for the electromagnetic field. This, for Worrall,
is evidence of structure retention across theory change, licensing realism about structure.
But Chakravartty argues that it’s somewhat misleading to think that structure is all that
counts in analyzing this shift. We need to say something, after all, about how it is that we can
have a correct structural (mathematical) representation of light phenomena in the first place.
This, Chakravartty argues, depends on our abilities to detect certain properties of objects in the
course of empirical investigation:
94
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[…] light is something which, on the basis of these mathematical relations, we associate with the
following: influences propagated rectilinearly and made up of two components manifested at
right angles to one another and to the direction of propagation; each component as an amplitude
or intensity, the magnitude of which oscillates in a specific manner. Those properties of light
which compose or give rise to precisely these influences are detection properties, that is,
properties having to do with causal regularities on the basis of which we infer the existence of the
entity possessing them: light.95

Here, an ontology that includes objects and their dispositional properties is not a result of
uncareful metaphysical speculation. Rather, metaphysics is in direct contact with the process of
empirical investigation. As Cartwright (2015) says, a “good” metaphysics (and here she means a
good metaphysics for science, more specifically) is one with “solid empirical warrant” and one
that “will not stretch its neck out farther than necessary.” An objects-and-dispositions ontology
seems to be in good standing under such criteria.

3.2.2 Shifting the burden back to OSR
It would be up to the OSR defender, then, to say why we should adopt her view and its eschewal
of objects and dispositions even in the face of what looks like good empirical success. That is to
say, it plausibly involves an even greater commitment to seemingly obscure metaphysical
contortions of reality to accept the implications of OSR. If that’s not the case, the OSR defender
must give a very convincing argument why not, since the empirical warrant underwriting the
opposing view looks comparatively immense. The OSR defender does think she has a response,
but this will be covered in the next section where I discuss OSR’s “heuristic” approach to the
special sciences.
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3.3 Against OSR’s argument from (lack of) identity
Recall from (§3.1) that a key part of the argument for OSR comes from permutation invariance
in quantum statistics. French (2014, pp. 34-35) illustrates this again using a simple quantum
system of two particles. The system also includes two boxes, where each particle is placed in one
box, but neither box contains both particles. As already discussed, the intuitive treatment of this
system would be to say that it has two possible states, since we tend to think that were each
particle to switch boxes with the other, that would count as a different state. But French points
out that contemporary physics understands this as just one state: there’s no difference between
the “two” arrangements, and for French and others in the OSR camp this serves to undercut any
primitive notion of identity.96

3.3.1 Metaphysical underdetermination
This leads to what French (2014) terms “metaphysical underdetermination” with respect to
individuals and objects. Our basic intuition, according to French and others, is that some
intelligible notion of individuality and object-hood can be given in terms of fundamental physics,
since the typical way of thinking about fundamental physics involves tiny, individuated, hard
little parts that bang against one another in various ways. This is intellectually comforting, since
where we may see cases of metaphysical underdetermination with respect to macro objects
(tables, chairs, T.V. sets, planets, and the like), we’re assured that there is in fact some primitive
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notion of identity that can be appealed to in physics, and so getting individuality and object-hood
right in the macro world is just a matter of finding the right map from the micro to the macro.97
French (2014) tells us that the case is much worse as regards underdetermination, because
there’s no primitive notion of identity at all. So, he says, we might try to hold onto objects and
just claim that objects are in some sense real, but that they are “non-individual.”98 But he thinks
(and I agree) that such a notion seems hardly intelligible at all. That aside, he also claims that
such an approach involves too much “epistemic humility” (French, 2014 pp. 54-60). French’s
idea is that our metaphysical commitments should stay as close to our best fundamental physics
as possible. So, if the clear implication from fundamental physics is that there is no clear notion
of identity or object-hood, so much the worse for any such notion.99 To claim instead that there
are real individual objects behind the structural descriptions of physics, but that we just can’t
know them,100 involves “too much humility” for any scientific realist worthy of the name to
stomach (French, 2014 pp. 60-1).

3.3.2 Responding to the problem of metaphysical underdetermination
I think the “object oriented realist” can say at least two things to the OSR defender here. The first
is just this: why think that epistemic humility is not the right stance to take? French gives
essentially two reasons. (1) It flies in the face of scientific realism, and (2) our metaphysical
commitments should stick as close as possible to physics. I think the response to (1) is obvious.
That is, when our commitments to a particular form of scientific realism run into real problems,
it may just be necessary to revise our realist commitments. This shouldn’t come as a surprise to
97
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structural realists, since their view just is such a revision. Why should realism be revised up to
the structuralist commitments of French’s version of OSR, but not any farther than that? This
particular metaphysical interpretation of identity in quantum field theory is just one interpretation
among several. It may be that some coherent conception of identity and object-hood is possible
in QFT, but as of now such conceptions are at best vague and incomplete. French has to tell us
why we should not revise scientific realism such that it can accommodate more epistemic
humility (I for one would probably welcome such a revision).
A convincing response to (2) takes a bit more effort. French’s statements about (2) can be
charitably reconstructed into the following argument:
(1) We have no reason to retain anything in our ontology if it requires too much epistemic
humility and there is an alternative metaphysics that doesn’t require it.
(2) Contemporary physics suggests that commitment to individuals and objects does
require a great deal of epistemic humility.
(3) OSR does not require a commitment to individuals or objects.
(4) We should therefore reject individuals and objects as legitimate parts of our ontology.
My response is directed at (1) and (2) in the argument above. More specifically, neither the
science nor the metaphysics really suggest that epistemic humility creates a real problem (except,
perhaps, a psychological one), and further, in order to ground our metaphysics in “what physics
suggests” we must have a clear sense of what physics should be taken to imply for our
metaphysics. I will argue that the case isn’t quite so clear.

3.3.3 Undertermination as metaphysically innocuous
For French (2014) the problem of epistemic humility is clearly tied up with the problem of the
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metaphysical underdetermination of objects. The physics doesn’t give us a clear picture of what
an individual object is, so we should get rid of objects and instead cast our commitments in terms
of the structures described by group theory and the like. But Chakravartty (2007) argues that the
problem of underdetermination isn’t really that surprising. Metaphysical underdetermination is
involved in (and even motivates) a broad range of metaphysical projects. Ted Sider’s (2012)
Writing the Book of the World attempts to solve problems of underdetermination by identifying a
minimally sufficient “joint carving” set of laws and concepts for dividing up the world. Peter van
Inwagen embraces the underdetermination of ordinary objects to the effect that he endorses an
ontology containing just two kinds: particles and people (and not “people” in the biological
sense!). For Chakravartty’s part, he argues that we’re constantly confronted with cases of
underdetermination concerning how we should secure the identities of everyday objects like
desks and trees, but we don’t typically think that there aren’t any desks or trees, and so we may
be warranted in thinking of underdetermination of the sort French points out as likewise
innocuous.101
French responds that we’re not warranted in taking his sort of underdetermination as
innocuous with respect to the status of objects because fundamental physics is just what it says:
fundamental.102 Because of the fundamental status of fundamental physics, we are to understand
that the inability to secure a notion of individual object-hood at the level of physics implies that
no such notion could be forthcoming. Chakravartty’s “innocuous” underdetermination only
works, according to French, if there’s something more fundamental one can appeal to in order to
secure a notion of object-hood, but he’s just shown that this move can’t be successful. So, we
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should close the gap of epistemic humility between our intuitions about objects and what physics
has to say about them by tailoring our commitments to whatever the physics says.
Now it looks like French is arguing against epistemic humility on grounds that realists
should not permit too much epistemic humility. French hasn’t actually given any argument to
show that epistemic humility is harmful to realism, except maybe in the sense that too much of it
would create some skepticism toward the notion that fundamental physics is directly informing
our metaphysics, which seems self-serving. Couldn’t epistemic humility be useful for realists,
though? It seems to me that epistemic humility is plausibly conducive to epistemic flexibility,103
and this is likely something that we want as realists, just given the history of science and
scientific change. After all, the direction of theory change looks pretty unpredictable from our
present position. A stance that invites theory defeaters as a progressive tool looks like the best
stance to take, then, and so an epistemically humble stance looks better than the alternative.

3.3.4 Epistemic humility as the best justified stance
There are two further a position of epistemic humility might be the best justified one with respect
to how we should read our metaphysical commitments off of the physics. There are two senses in
which we might be justified in claiming this. It may be that the suggestions of physics are at best
ambiguous on the subject of individuality and object-hood. If that’s the case, we may be
warranted in following Chakravartty (2007) in taking underdetermination (even in fundamental
physics) as basically innocuous. There is some precedent for thinking the physics is, in fact,
broadly ambiguous. As French seems to recognize himself, the early structuralists (both in
philosophy and physics) typically thought that there were real objects underlying the structural
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descriptions of physics, but held this knowledge as inferential rather than direct.104 If this early
structuralist position is right (and I’m not claiming it is) then a position of epistemic humility
with respect to objects and the like looks like it’s just the right position to be in. French hasn’t
given much of an argument against such a position, except to say that it involves “too much
humility” for any realist to entertain. I’ve already said what I think of that claim.

3.3.5 A further response to the underdetermination problem
The second (and most important) response is this: why think metaphysics is domain general?
Which is to say, it may not be the case that one can carry out a metaphysical analysis of objecthood in fundamental physics and then just import that same analysis into the domains of
chemistry, biology and all the rest. Establishing what counts as an object in biology may require
a different mode of analysis involving a different set of identity conditions than similar questions
applied to physics. At least on the face of it, we probably don’t think transformation symmetries
establish all of the relevant facts of object identity in biology, since biological populations are
surely not permutation invariant! Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that the task of metaphysics
just is the unification of the sciences. But whether or not the broad unification of the special
sciences with fundamental physics is possible is really more of an empirical question, and so far
the evidence suggests that it is not (Cartwright, 1999). French (2014, pp. 326-328) recognizes
this, but then runs roughshod over the special sciences anyway.
French notes, for instance, that the directionality of thermodynamics poses problems for
the reduction of chemistry to physics. He notes similar problems with respect to the reduction of
biology to chemistry, but maintains throughout that there must, in principle, be some solution to
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the problem of reduction, and that it may be discovered by some future science.105 Here French is
happy to shift to a heuristic mode, and claim that the biologist can still offer explanations in
terms of the workings of genes, proteins, organisms, and the like, but he cautions that when
we’re doing metaphysics we should not slide into thinking there really are any such things. In
fact, there are no things at all, just the structures described by physics.
The OSR defender owes us more than this, though. The fact that the special sciences have
proven so resilient to reductionist explanations seems to be a fact that itself cries out for an
explanation, and a better explanation than the promissory notes that we’re used to receiving. We
have good reason to think (e.g. everything from chapters 1 and 2) that this resilience against
reduction really has to do with some non-reducible properties possessed by the phenomena that
are treated within their respective domains of investigation. If that’s the case, it may be that our
metaphysics should follow suit and display the same “patchwork” pattern that our sciences
exhibit. It may be that French is right about individuality and object-hood at the level of the
physics, but a metaphysics that involves objects, powers, dispositions and the like may still be
necessary for a robust analysis of the biological domain. The first two chapters of this thesis
make a case for two candidate phenomena in evolutionary biology: fitness and evolvability.
Fitness and evolvability, it was argued, are dispositional properties of objects; namely,
organisms. Further, if we want to understand how organisms and populations change in
evolutionary history, we need to understand the causal contributions of these dispositional
properties. For fitness this involves some understanding of the causal interactions between traits
embedded in trait complexes, and for evolvability this involves understanding how different
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Or, if not discovered by some future science, he argues we may still be permitted to exclude from our ontology
any content that doesn’t feature in fundamental physics (see French 2014, pp. 325-30). This move is somewhat
suspicious, since it amounts to claiming that even if the sciences don’t actually do the work of justifying physics’
epistemic and ontological authority over the rest of science, physics gets to hold trump cards anyway.
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strategies can be deployed in order to realize some target region in morphological space. The
OSR defender has done little to show how to explain away such phenomena. French (2014,
p.212) gestures vaguely at the problem by talking about “structural change,” but change in
evolution (at least of the sort I’m talking about) involves more than just a shift of structural
relations or rearrangement of the “nodes.” It involves the interaction of biological objects and
their causal powers.
Take as an example the typical account of the origin of upright, bipedal locomotion in
later Homo. Sparing a lot of the messy details, it’s usually thought that this evolutionary novelty
was at least in part due to a selective regime that favored organisms that could travel longer
distances on foot in some of the grassy plains of Africa’s Great Rift Valley (the ability to travel
longer distances made water procurement easier, for instance). In order to hit the right target in
morphological space, it is necessary to have something that can be properly disposed to
developing the necessary evolutionary novelties. In this case it was necessary to have an
organism that could properly decouple hind-limb development from fore-limb development
(Brown, 2014), develop a large musculature structure in the gluteal region for stabilization, and a
certain spinal contour that could appropriately support the head (see Lovejoy, 1988). This case
clearly involves appeal to dispositions: the ability to decouple certain anatomical structures in the
course of development, some standing musculature structure that can adaptively respond to a
selective regime favoring gluteal structures capable of performing front-back stabilization, etc.
And clearly these are dispositional properties are ascribed to something: ancestral apes and early
hominids. If physics doesn’t support such notions, this may well be because the things of physics
don’t support talk in terms of objects and dispositions whereas evolutionary biology does. If
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that’s the case, then we should not only shift scientific modes when going from biology to
physics, but also metaphysical modes.

3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I outlined some of the core arguments and commitments involved in Ontic
Structural Realism. OSR is a relative newcomer in the metaphysics of science literature. OSR
bears relevance to my project because of its potential implications with respect to realism about
objects and dispositions of the sort I’ve argued for in chapters one and two of this thesis. I’ve
argued against OSR’s treatment of objects and dispositions on two separate but related grounds.
On the one hand, OSR’s position on such matters seems to fly in the face of scientific practice,
and this without much warrant. Any form of metaphysics that moves so strongly against the
empirical grain of the sciences must provide some very convincing reasons to warrant doing so.
OSR, I argue, has not provided such reasons. I argue further that OSR defenders are guilty of
illicit inference in that they take the purported lack of identity manifest in quantum systems as
sufficient for lack of identity in general. The OSR defender has not shown that such a
metaphysical move is legitimate, and indeed there seems to be good empirical motivation
underlying sympathies to a disunified view of the sciences and metaphysics.
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CONCLUSION
I’ve argued for a realist interpretation of dispositions and their active role in causal processes in
evolutionary biology. In the case of fitness, I argued that the relevant dispositional property is to
be understood as applying to whole organisms as a result of the total causal interactions among
an organism’s traits. In the case of evolvability, I argued that the relevant property may be treated
as a functional disposition that’s multiply realizable.
More generally, I take the cumulative results of chapters 1 and 2 to show that any
ontologically deflationary treatment of dispositions in the metaphysics of science has quite a bit
to answer for. Explanations in terms of dispositions, powers, capacities and the like feature quite
heavily in the natural sciences, and indeed, close analysis suggests that an earnest commitment to
such things as constituent members of our ontology best accounts for our empirical experience of
such dispositions and powers.
I’ve presented Ontic Structural Realism as a potential rival that dispenses with the need to
appeal to things like objects and dispositions. I argued, however, that such an account flies in the
face of our empirical warrant both for retaining objects and dispositions as parts of our ontology,
and for regarding the natural sciences as disunified rather than unified with or reducible to
fundamental physics. Because we have good empirical warrant for understanding the sciences as
disunified, there are good reasons to think that metaphysics should be thought of as domain
specific. We need not see Ontic Structural Realism as a threat to the objects and dispositions that
ground our metaphysical analysis of evolutionary biology, then. We’re free to treat dispositional
properties (like fitness and evolvability) as real and causally active in evolution.
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